rfc9578.original.xml		rfc9578.xml
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	<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft
	-ietf-privacypass-protocol-16" category="std" consensus="true" tocInclude="true"		<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft
	sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">		-ietf-privacypass-protocol-16" number="9578" submissionType="IETF" category="std
			" consensus="true" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" updates="" o
			bsoletes="" xml:lang="en" version="3">
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	<front>		<front>
	<title abbrev="Privacy Pass Issuance">Privacy Pass Issuance Protocol</title>		<title abbrev="Privacy Pass Issuance">Privacy Pass Issuance Protocols</title
	<seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-privacypass-protocol-16"		>
	/>		<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9578"/>
	<author initials="S." surname="Celi" fullname="Sofía Celi">		<author initials="S." surname="Celi" fullname="Sofía Celi">
	<organization>Brave Software</organization>		<organization>Brave Software</organization>
	<address>		<address>
	<postal>		<postal>
	<city>Lisbon</city>		<city>Lisbon</city>
	<country>Portugal</country>		<country>Portugal</country>
	</postal>		</postal>
	<email>cherenkov@riseup.net</email>		<email>cherenkov@riseup.net</email>
	</address>		</address>
	</author>		</author>
	<author initials="A." surname="Davidson" fullname="Alex Davidson">		<author initials="A." surname="Davidson" fullname="Alex Davidson">
	<organization>Brave Software</organization>		<organization>NOVA LINCS, Universidade NOVA de Lisboa</organization>
	<address>		<address>
	<postal>		<postal>
	<city>Lisbon</city>		<street>Largo da Torre</street>
			<city>Caparica</city>
	<country>Portugal</country>		<country>Portugal</country>
	</postal>		</postal>
	<email>alex.davidson92@gmail.com</email>		<email>alex.davidson92@gmail.com</email>
	</address>		</address>
	</author>		</author>
	<author initials="S." surname="Valdez" fullname="Steven Valdez">		<author initials="S." surname="Valdez" fullname="Steven Valdez">
	<organization>Google LLC</organization>		<organization>Google LLC</organization>
	<address>		<address>
	<email>svaldez@chromium.org</email>		<email>svaldez@chromium.org</email>
	</address>		</address>
	</author>		</author>
	<author initials="C. A." surname="Wood" fullname="Christopher A. Wood">		<author initials="C. A." surname="Wood" fullname="Christopher A. Wood">
	<organization>Cloudflare</organization>		<organization>Cloudflare</organization>
	<address>		<address>
	<postal>		<postal>
	<street>101 Townsend St</street>		<street>101 Townsend St</street>
	<city>San Francisco</city>		<city>San Francisco</city>
			<region>CA</region>
			<code>94107</code>
	<country>United States of America</country>		<country>United States of America</country>
	</postal>		</postal>
	<email>caw@heapingbits.net</email>		<email>caw@heapingbits.net</email>
	</address>		</address>
	</author>		</author>
	<date year="2023" month="October" day="03"/>		<date year="2024" month="May"/>
	<keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword>		<area>sec</area>
			<workgroup>privacypass</workgroup>
	<abstract>		<abstract>
	<t>This document specifies two variants of the two-message issuance protoc ol		<t>This document specifies two variants of the two-message issuance protoc ol
	for Privacy Pass tokens: one that produces tokens that are privately		for Privacy Pass tokens: one that produces tokens that are privately
	verifiable using the issuance private key, and another that produces tokens		verifiable using the Issuer Private Key and one that produces tokens
	that are publicly verifiable using the issuance public key.</t>		that are publicly verifiable using the Issuer Public Key. &nbsp;Instances of "is
			suance protocol" and "issuance protocols" in the text of this document are used
			interchangeably to refer to the two variants of the Privacy Pass issuance protoc
			ol.</t>
	</abstract>		</abstract>
	</front>		</front>
	<middle>		<middle>
	<section anchor="introduction">		<section anchor="introduction">
	<name>Introduction</name>		<name>Introduction</name>
	<t>The Privacy Pass protocol provides a privacy-preserving authorization		<t>The Privacy Pass protocol provides a privacy-preserving authorization
	mechanism. In essence, the protocol allows clients to provide cryptographic		mechanism. In essence, the protocol allows Clients to provide cryptographic
	tokens that prove nothing other than that they have been created by a given		tokens that prove nothing other than that they have been created by a given
	server in the past <xref target="ARCHITECTURE"/>.</t>		server in the past <xref target="RFC9576"/>.</t>
	<t>This document describes the issuance protocol for Privacy Pass built on		<t>This document describes two issuance protocols for Privacy Pass, each o
	<xref target="HTTP"/>. It specifies two variants: one that is privately verifiab		f which is built on
	le		<xref target="RFC9110"/>. It specifies two variants: one that is privately verif
	using the issuance private key based on the oblivious pseudorandom function from		iable
	<xref target="OPRF"/>, and one that is publicly verifiable using the		using the Issuer Private Key based on the Oblivious Pseudorandom Function (OPRF)
	issuance public key based on the blind RSA signature scheme		as defined in <xref target="RFC9497"/> and one that is publicly verifiable usin
	<xref target="BLINDRSA"/>.</t>		g the
	<t>This document does not cover the Privacy Pass architecture, including		Issuer Public Key based on the blind RSA signature scheme
	choices that are necessary for deployment and application specific choices		<xref target="RFC9474"/>.
	for protecting client privacy. This information is covered in <xref target="ARCH		Instances of "issuance protocol" and "issuance protocols" in the
	ITECTURE"/>.</t>		text of this document are used interchangeably to refer to the two
			variants of the Privacy Pass issuance protocol.</t>
			<t>This document does not cover the Privacy Pass architecture, which
			includes (1)&nbsp;choices that are necessary for deployment and (2)&nbsp;applica
			tion-specific choices for protecting Client privacy.
			This information is covered in <xref target="RFC9576"/>.</t>
	</section>		</section>
	<section anchor="terminology">		<section anchor="terminology">
	<name>Terminology</name>		<name>Terminology</name>
	<t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL		<t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>",
	NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED",		"<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>",
	"MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as		"<bcp14>SHALL NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>",
	described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and		"<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>",
	only when, they		"<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
	appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>		"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document
	<t>This document uses the terms Origin, Client, Issuer, and Token as defin		are to be interpreted as described in BCP&nbsp;14
	ed in		<xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only
	<xref section="2" sectionFormat="of" target="ARCHITECTURE"/>. Moreover, the foll		when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
	owing additional terms are		<t>This document uses the terms "Origin", "Client", "Issuer", and "Token"
			as defined in
			<xref section="2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9576"/>. Moreover, the following
			additional terms are
	used throughout this document.</t>		used throughout this document.</t>
	<ul spacing="normal">		<dl spacing="normal">
	<li>Issuer Public Key: The public key (from a private-public key pair) u		<dt>Issuer Public Key:</dt><dd>The public key (from a private-public key
	sed by		pair) used by
	the Issuer for issuing and verifying Tokens.</li>		the Issuer for issuing and verifying tokens.</dd>
	<li>Issuer Private Key: The private key (from a private-public key pair)		<dt>Issuer Private Key:</dt><dd>The private key (from a private-public k
	used by		ey pair) used by
	the Issuer for issuing and verifying Tokens.</li>		the Issuer for issuing and verifying tokens.</dd>
	</ul>		</dl>
	<t>Unless otherwise specified, this document encodes protocol messages in TLS		<t>Unless otherwise specified, this document encodes protocol messages in TLS
	notation from <xref section="3" sectionFormat="of" target="TLS13"/>. Moreover, a ll constants are in		notation (<xref section="3" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8446"/>). Moreover, all constants are in
	network byte order.</t>		network byte order.</t>
	</section>		</section>
	<section anchor="protocol-overview">		<section anchor="protocol-overview">
	<name>Protocol Overview</name>		<name>Protocol Overview</name>
	<t>The issuance protocols defined in this document embody the core of Priv acy Pass.		<t>The issuance protocols defined in this document embody the core of Priv acy Pass.
	Clients receive TokenChallenge inputs from the redemption protocol		Clients receive TokenChallenge inputs from the redemption protocol
	(<xref section="2.1" sectionFormat="comma" target="AUTHSCHEME"/>) and use the is		(<xref section="2.1" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC9577"/>) and use the issua
	suance protocols to produce		nce protocols to produce
	corresponding Token values (<xref section="2.2" sectionFormat="comma" target="AU		corresponding token values (<xref section="2.2" sectionFormat="comma" target="RF
	THSCHEME"/>). The issuance protocol		C9577"/>). The issuance protocol
	describes how Clients and Issuers interact to compute a token using a one-round		describes how Clients and Issuers interact to compute a token using a one-round
	protocol consisting of a TokenRequest from the Client and TokenResponse from		protocol consisting of a TokenRequest from the Client and a TokenResponse from
	the Issuer. This interaction is shown below.</t>		the Issuer. This interaction is shown below.</t>
	<figure anchor="fig-issuance">		<figure anchor="fig-issuance">
	<name>Issuance Overview</name>		<name>Issuance Overview</name>
			<!-- Removed height="224" width="520" to see if the SVG will display
			correctly in the HTML and PDF outputs. -->
	<artset>		<artset>
	<artwork type="svg"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1 .1" height="224" width="520" viewBox="0 0 520 224" class="diagram" text-anchor=" middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px" stroke-linecap="round">		<artwork type="svg"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1 .1" viewBox="0 0 520 224" class="diagram" text-anchor="middle" font-family="mono space" font-size="13px" stroke-linecap="round">
	<path d="M 8,32 L 8,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>		<path d="M 8,32 L 8,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 40,64 L 40,208" fill="none" stroke="black"/>		<path d="M 40,64 L 40,208" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 80,32 L 80,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>		<path d="M 80,32 L 80,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 184,32 L 184,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>		<path d="M 184,32 L 184,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 216,64 L 216,208" fill="none" stroke="black"/>		<path d="M 216,64 L 216,208" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 256,32 L 256,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>		<path d="M 256,32 L 256,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
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	<path d="M 376,64 L 376,144" fill="none" stroke="black"/>		<path d="M 376,64 L 376,144" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 376,192 L 376,208" fill="none" stroke="black"/>		<path d="M 376,192 L 376,208" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
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	skipping to change at line 184 ¶		skipping to change at line 201 ¶
	| |<== Attestation ==>| |		| |<== Attestation ==>| |
	| | | |		| | | |
	| +--------- TokenRequest ------->|		| +--------- TokenRequest ------->|
	| |<-------- TokenResponse -------+		| |<-------- TokenResponse -------+
	|<-- Request+Token ---+ | |		|<-- Request+Token ---+ | |
	| | | |		| | | |
	]]></artwork>		]]></artwork>
	</artset>		</artset>
	</figure>		</figure>
	<t>The TokenChallenge inputs to the issuance protocols described in this		<t>The TokenChallenge inputs to the issuance protocols described in this
	document can be interactive or non-interactive, and per-origin or cross-origin.< /t>		document can be interactive or non-interactive and can be per Origin or across O rigins.</t>
	<t>The issuance protocols defined in this document are compatible with any		<t>The issuance protocols defined in this document are compatible with any
	deployment model defined in <xref section="4" sectionFormat="of" target="ARCHITE CTURE"/>. The details of		deployment model defined in <xref section="4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9576 "/>. The details of
	attestation are outside the scope of the issuance protocol; see		attestation are outside the scope of the issuance protocol; see
	<xref section="4" sectionFormat="of" target="ARCHITECTURE"/> for information abo ut how attestation can		<xref section="4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9576"/> for information about ho w attestation can
	be implemented in each of the relevant deployment models.</t>		be implemented in each of the relevant deployment models.</t>
	<t>This document describes two variants of the issuance protocol: one that is		<t>This document describes two variants of the issuance protocol: one that is
	privately verifiable (<xref target="private-flow"/>) using the issuance private		privately verifiable (<xref target="private-flow"/>) using the Issuer Private Ke
	key based on		y based on
	the oblivious pseudorandom function from <xref target="OPRF"/>, and one		the OPRF <xref target="RFC9497"/> and one
	that is publicly verifiable (<xref target="public-flow"/>) using the issuance pu		that is publicly verifiable (<xref target="public-flow"/>) using the Issuer Publ
	blic key		ic Key
	based on the blind RSA signature scheme		based on the blind RSA signature scheme
	<xref target="BLINDRSA"/>.</t>		<xref target="RFC9474"/>.</t>
	</section>		</section>
	<section anchor="setup">		<section anchor="setup">
	<name>Configuration</name>		<name>Configuration</name>
	<t>Issuers MUST provide two parameters for configuration:</t>		<t>Issuers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> provide two parameters for configuration:</
	<ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>Issuer Request URL: A token request URL		t>
	for generating access tokens.		<dl spacing="normal"><dt>Issuer Request URL:</dt><dd>A token request URL f
	For example, an Issuer URL might be		or generating access tokens.
	https://issuer.example.net/request.</li>		For example, an Issuer Request URL might be
	<li>Issuer Public Key values: A list of Issuer Public Keys for the issua		&lt;https://issuer.example.net/request&gt;.</dd>
	nce		<dt>Issuer Public Key values:</dt><dd>A list of Issuer Public Keys for t
	protocol.</li>		he issuance
	</ol>		protocol.</dd>
			</dl>
	<t>The Issuer parameters can be obtained from an Issuer via a directory ob ject,		<t>The Issuer parameters can be obtained from an Issuer via a directory ob ject,
	which is a JSON object (<xref section="4" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8259" />) whose values are other JSON		which is a JSON object (<xref section="4" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8259" />) whose values are other JSON
	values (<xref section="3" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8259"/>) for the para meters. The contents of this JSON		values (<xref section="3" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8259"/>) for the para meters. The contents of this JSON
	object are defined in <xref target="directory-values"/>.</t>		object are defined in <xref target="directory-values"/>.</t>
	<table anchor="directory-values">		<table anchor="directory-values">
	<name>Issuer directory object description</name>		<name>Issuer Directory Object Description</name>
	<thead>		<thead>
	<tr>		<tr>
	<th align="left">Field Name</th>		<th align="left">Field Name</th>
	<th align="left">Value</th>		<th align="left">Value</th>
	</tr>		</tr>
	</thead>		</thead>
	<tbody>		<tbody>
	<tr>		<tr>
	<td align="left">issuer-request-uri</td>		<td align="left">issuer-request-uri</td>
	<td align="left">Issuer Request URL value (as an absolute URL, or a URL relative to the directory object) as a percent-encoded URL string, represent ed as a JSON string (<xref section="7" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8259"/>) </td>		<td align="left">Issuer Request URL value (as an absolute URL or as a URL relative to the directory object) as a percent-encoded URL string, represe nted as a JSON string (<xref section="7" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8259"/ >)</td>
	</tr>		</tr>
	<tr>		<tr>
	<td align="left">token-keys</td>		<td align="left">token-keys</td>
	<td align="left">List of Issuer Public Key values, each represented as JSON objects (<xref section="4" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8259"/>)</td >		<td align="left">List of Issuer Public Key values, each represented as JSON objects (<xref section="4" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8259"/>)</td >
	</tr>		</tr>
	</tbody>		</tbody>
	</table>		</table>
	<t>Each "token-keys" JSON object contains the fields and corresponding raw values		<t>Each "token-keys" JSON object contains the fields and corresponding raw values
	defined in <xref target="tokenkeys-values"/>.</t>		defined in <xref target="tokenkeys-values"/>.</t>
	<table anchor="tokenkeys-values">		<table anchor="tokenkeys-values">
	<name>Issuer 'token-keys' object description'</name>		<name>Issuer &quot;token-keys&quot; Object Description</name>
	<thead>		<thead>
	<tr>		<tr>
	<th align="left">Field Name</th>		<th align="left">Field Name</th>
	<th align="left">Value</th>		<th align="left">Value</th>
	</tr>		</tr>
	</thead>		</thead>
	<tbody>		<tbody>
	<tr>		<tr>
	<td align="left">token-type</td>		<td align="left">token-type</td>
	<td align="left">Integer value of the Token Type, as defined in <xre f target="token-type"/>, represented as a JSON number (<xref section="6" section Format="comma" target="RFC8259"/>)</td>		<td align="left">Integer value of the token type, as defined in <xre f target="token-type"/>, represented as a JSON number (<xref section="6" section Format="comma" target="RFC8259"/>)</td>
	</tr>		</tr>
	<tr>		<tr>
	<td align="left">token-key</td>		<td align="left">token-key</td>
	<td align="left">The base64url-encoded <xref target="RFC4648"/> Publ ic Key for use with the issuance protocol as determined by the token-type field, including padding, represented as a JSON string (<xref section="7" sectionForma t="comma" target="RFC8259"/>)</td>		<td align="left">The base64url public key, encoded per <xref target= "RFC4648"/>, for use with the issuance protocol as determined by the token-type field, including padding, represented as a JSON string (<xref section="7" sectio nFormat="comma" target="RFC8259"/>)</td>
	</tr>		</tr>
	</tbody>		</tbody>
	</table>		</table>
	<t>Each "token-keys" JSON object may also contain the optional field "not- before".		<t>Each "token-keys" JSON object may also contain the optional field "not- before".
	The value of this field is the UNIX timestamp (number of seconds since		The value of this field is the UNIX timestamp (number of seconds since
	January 1, 1970, UTC -- see <xref section="4.2.1" sectionFormat="of" target="TIM		January 1, 1970, UTC -- see <xref section="4.2.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC
	ESTAMP"/>) at which		8877"/>) at which
	the key can be used. If this field is present, Clients SHOULD NOT use a token		the key can be used. If this field is present, Clients <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>
			use a token
	key before this timestamp, as doing so can lead to issuance failures. The		key before this timestamp, as doing so can lead to issuance failures. The
	purpose of this field is to assist in scheduled key rotations.</t>		purpose of this field is to assist in scheduled key rotations.</t>
	<t>Beyond staging keys with the "not-before" value, Issuers MAY advertise multiple		<t>Beyond staging keys with the "not-before" value, Issuers <bcp14>MAY</bc p14> advertise multiple
	"token-keys" for the same token-type to facilitate key rotation. In this case,		"token-keys" for the same token-type to facilitate key rotation. In this case,
	Issuers indicate preference for which token key to use based on the order of		Issuers indicate their preference for which token key to use based on the order of
	keys in the list, with preference given to keys earlier in the list. Clients		keys in the list, with preference given to keys earlier in the list. Clients
	SHOULD use the first key in the "token-keys" list that either does not have a		<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use the first key in the "token-keys" list that either doe s not have a
	"not-before" value or has a "not-before" value in the past, since the first such key is the		"not-before" value or has a "not-before" value in the past, since the first such key is the
	most likely to be valid in the given time window. Origins can attempt		most likely to be valid in the given time window. Origins can attempt
	to use any key in the "token-keys" list to verify tokens, starting with the most		to use any key in the "token-keys" list to verify tokens, starting with the most
	preferred key in the list. Trial verification like this can help deal with Clien t		preferred key in the list. Trial verifications like this can help deal with Clie nt
	clock skew.</t>		clock skew.</t>
	<t>Altogether, the Issuer's directory could look like the following (with the		<t>Altogether, the Issuer's directory could look like the following (with the
	"token-key" fields abbreviated):</t>		"token-key" fields abbreviated):</t>
	<artwork><![CDATA[		<artwork><![CDATA[
	{		{
	"issuer-request-uri": "https://issuer.example.net/request",		"issuer-request-uri": "https://issuer.example.net/request",
	"token-keys": [		"token-keys": [
	{		{
	"token-type": 2,		"token-type": 2,
	"token-key": "MI...AB",		"token-key": "MI...AB",
	skipping to change at line 291 ¶		skipping to change at line 308 ¶
	]		]
	}		}
	]]></artwork>		]]></artwork>
	<t>Clients that use this directory resource before 1686913811 in UNIX time would use the		<t>Clients that use this directory resource before 1686913811 in UNIX time would use the
	second key in the "token-keys" list, whereas Clients that use this directory aft er		second key in the "token-keys" list, whereas Clients that use this directory aft er
	1686913811 in UNIX time would use the first key in the "token-keys" list.</t>		1686913811 in UNIX time would use the first key in the "token-keys" list.</t>
	<t>A complete "token-key" value, encoded as it would be in the Issuer dire ctory,		<t>A complete "token-key" value, encoded as it would be in the Issuer dire ctory,
	would look like the following (line breaks are inserted to fit within the per-li ne		would look like the following (line breaks are inserted to fit within the per-li ne
	character limits):</t>		character limits):</t>
	<artwork><![CDATA[		<artwork><![CDATA[
	$ echo MIIBUjA9BgkqhkiG9w0BAQowMKANMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAqEaMBgGCSqGSIb3DQEBCDAL \		$ echo MIIBUjA9BgkqhkiG9w0BAQowMKANMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAqEaMBgGCSqGSIb3DQE \
	BglghkgBZQMEAgKiAwIBMAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAmKHGAMyeoJt1pj3n7xTtqAPr_DhZAPhJM7 \		BCDALBglghkgBZQMEAgKiAwIBMAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAmKHGAMyeoJt1pj3n7xTtqAPr \
	Pc8ENR2BzdZwPTTF7KFKms5wt-mL01at0SC-cdBuIj6WYK8Ovz0AyaBuvTvW6SKCh7ZPXEqCGR \		_DhZAPhJM7Pc8ENR2BzdZwPTTF7KFKms5wt-mL01at0SC-cdBuIj6WYK8Ovz0AyaBuvTv \
	sq5I0nthREtrYkGo113oMVPVp3sy4VHPgzd8KdzTLGzOrjiUOsSFWbjf21iaVjXJ2VdwdS-8O- \		W6SKCh7ZPXEqCGRsq5I0nthREtrYkGo113oMVPVp3sy4VHPgzd8KdzTLGzOrjiUOsSFWb \
	430wkucYjGeOJwi8rWx_ZkcHtav0S67Q_SlExJel6nyRzpuuID9OQm1nxfs1Z4PhWBzt93T2oz \		jf21iaVjXJ2VdwdS-8O-430wkucYjGeOJwi8rWx_ZkcHtav0S67Q_SlExJel6nyRzpuuI \
	Tnda3OklF5n0pIXD6bttmTekIw_8Xx2LMis0jfJ1QL99aA-muXRFN4ZUwORrF7cAcCUD_-56_6 \		D9OQm1nxfs1Z4PhWBzt93T2ozTnda3OklF5n0pIXD6bttmTekIw_8Xx2LMis0jfJ1QL99 \
	fh9s34FmqBGwIDAQAB \		aA-muXRFN4ZUwORrF7cAcCUD_-56_6fh9s34FmqBGwIDAQAB \
	| sed s/-/+/g | sed s/_/\\//g | openssl base64 -d \		| sed s/-/+/g | sed s/_/\\//g | openssl base64 -d \
	| openssl asn1parse -dump -inform DER		| openssl asn1parse -dump -inform DER
	0:d=0 hl=4 l= 338 cons: SEQUENCE		0:d=0 hl=4 l= 338 cons: SEQUENCE
	4:d=1 hl=2 l= 61 cons: SEQUENCE		4:d=1 hl=2 l= 61 cons: SEQUENCE
	6:d=2 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :rsassaPss		6:d=2 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :rsassaPss
	17:d=2 hl=2 l= 48 cons: SEQUENCE		17:d=2 hl=2 l= 48 cons: SEQUENCE
	19:d=3 hl=2 l= 13 cons: cont [ 0 ]		19:d=3 hl=2 l= 13 cons: cont [ 0 ]
	21:d=4 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SEQUENCE		21:d=4 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SEQUENCE
	23:d=5 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :sha384		23:d=5 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :sha384
	34:d=3 hl=2 l= 26 cons: cont [ 1 ]		34:d=3 hl=2 l= 26 cons: cont [ 1 ]
	skipping to change at line 320 ¶		skipping to change at line 337 ¶
	49:d=5 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SEQUENCE		49:d=5 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SEQUENCE
	51:d=6 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :sha384		51:d=6 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :sha384
	62:d=3 hl=2 l= 3 cons: cont [ 2 ]		62:d=3 hl=2 l= 3 cons: cont [ 2 ]
	64:d=4 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :30		64:d=4 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :30
	67:d=1 hl=4 l= 271 prim: BIT STRING		67:d=1 hl=4 l= 271 prim: BIT STRING
	... truncated public key bytes ...		... truncated public key bytes ...
	]]></artwork>		]]></artwork>
	<t>Issuer directory resources have the media type		<t>Issuer directory resources have the media type
	"application/private-token-issuer-directory" and are located at the well-known l ocation		"application/private-token-issuer-directory" and are located at the well-known l ocation
	/.well-known/private-token-issuer-directory; see <xref target="wkuri-reg"/> for the registration		/.well-known/private-token-issuer-directory; see <xref target="wkuri-reg"/> for the registration
	information for this well-known URI. The reason that this resource is located		information for this well-known URI. This resource is located
	at a well-known URI is that Issuers are defined by an origin name in TokenChalle		at a well-known URI because Issuers are defined by an Origin name in TokenChalle
	nge		nge
	structures; see <xref section="2.1" sectionFormat="of" target="AUTHSCHEME"/>.</t		structures; see <xref section="2.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9577"/>.</t>
	>		<t>The Issuer directory and Issuer resources <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be avai
	<t>The Issuer directory and Issuer resources SHOULD be available on the sa		lable on the same Origin. If
	me origin. If		an Issuer wants to service multiple different Issuer directories, they <bcp14>MU
	an Issuer wants to service multiple different Issuer directories they MUST creat		ST</bcp14> create
	e		unique subdomains for each directory so the TokenChallenge defined in
	unique subdomains for each so the TokenChallenge defined in		<xref section="2.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9577"/> can be
	<xref section="2.1" sectionFormat="of" target="AUTHSCHEME"/> can be
	differentiated correctly.</t>		differentiated correctly.</t>
	<t>Issuers SHOULD use HTTP cache directives to permit caching of this reso urce		<t>Issuers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use HTTP cache directives to permit cachi ng of this resource
	<xref target="RFC5861"/>. The cache lifetime depends on the Issuer's key rotatio n schedule.		<xref target="RFC5861"/>. The cache lifetime depends on the Issuer's key rotatio n schedule.
	Regular rotation of token keys is recommended to minimize the risk of key		Regular rotation of token keys is recommended to minimize the risk of key
	compromise and any harmful effects that happen due to key compromise.</t>		compromise and any harmful effects that happen due to key compromise.</t>
	<t>Issuers can control cache lifetime with the Cache-Control header, as fo llows:</t>		<t>Issuers can control the cache lifetime with the Cache-Control header, a s follows:</t>
	<artwork><![CDATA[		<artwork><![CDATA[
	Cache-Control: max-age=86400		Cache-Control: max-age=86400
	]]></artwork>		]]></artwork>
	<t>Consumers of the Issuer directory resource SHOULD follow the usual HTTP		<t>Consumers of the Issuer directory resource <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> follow
	caching		the usual HTTP caching semantics
	<xref target="RFC9111"/> semantics when processing this resource. Long cache lif		<xref target="RFC9111"/> when processing this resource. Long cache lifetimes may
	etimes may		result in the use of stale Issuer configuration information, whereas short
	result in use of stale Issuer configuration information, whereas short		lifetimes may result in decreased performance. When the use of an Issuer
	lifetimes may result in decreased performance. When use of an Issuer
	configuration results in token issuance failures, e.g., because the		configuration results in token issuance failures, e.g., because the
	Issuer has invalidated its directory resource before its expiration		Issuer has invalidated its directory resource before its expiration
	time and issuance requests using this configuration are unsuccessful,		time and issuance requests using this configuration are unsuccessful,
	the directory SHOULD be fetched and revalidated. Issuance will continue		the directory <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be fetched and revalidated. Issuance will co ntinue
	to fail until the Issuer configuration is updated.</t>		to fail until the Issuer configuration is updated.</t>
	</section>		</section>
	<section anchor="private-flow">		<section anchor="private-flow">
	<name>Issuance Protocol for Privately Verifiable Tokens</name>		<name>Issuance Protocol for Privately Verifiable Tokens</name>
	<t>The privately verifiable issuance protocol allows Clients to produce To		<t>The privately verifiable issuance protocol allows Clients to produce to
	ken		ken
	values that verify using the Issuer Private Key. This protocol is based		values that verify using the Issuer Private Key. &nbsp;This protocol is based
	on the oblivious pseudorandom function from <xref target="OPRF"/>.</t>		on the OPRF <xref target="RFC9497"/>.</t>
	<t>Issuers provide a Issuer Private and Public Key, denoted <tt>skI</tt> a		<t>Issuers provide an Issuer Private Key and Public Key, denoted <tt>skI</
	nd <tt>pkI</tt> respectively,		tt> and <tt>pkI</tt>, respectively,
	used to produce tokens as input to the protocol. See <xref target="issuer-config uration"/>		used to produce tokens as input to the protocol. See <xref target="issuer-config uration"/>
	for how these keys are generated.</t>		for information about how these keys are generated.</t>
	<t>Clients provide the following as input to the issuance protocol:</t>		<t>Clients provide the following as input to the issuance protocol:</t>
	<ul spacing="normal">		<dl spacing="normal">
	<li>Issuer Request URL: A URL identifying the location to which issuance		<dt>Issuer Request URL:</dt><dd>A URL identifying the location to which
	requests		issuance requests
	are sent. This can be a URL derived from the "issuer-request-uri" value in the		are sent. This can be a URL derived from the "issuer-request-uri" value in the
	Issuer's directory resource, or it can be another Client-configured URL. The val ue		Issuer's directory resource, or it can be another Client-configured URL. The val ue
	of this parameter depends on the Client configuration and deployment model.		of this parameter depends on the Client configuration and deployment model.
	For example, in the 'Joint Origin and Issuer' deployment model, the Issuer		For example, in the "Joint Origin and Issuer" deployment model (<xref target="RF C9576" sectionFormat="comma" section="4.3"/>), the Issuer
	Request URL might correspond to the Client's configured Attester, and the		Request URL might correspond to the Client's configured Attester, and the
	Attester is configured to relay requests to the Issuer.</li>		Attester is configured to relay requests to the Issuer.</dd>
	<li>Issuer name: An identifier for the Issuer. This is typically a host		<dt>Issuer name:</dt><dd>An identifier for the Issuer. This is typically
	name that		a hostname that
	can be used to construct HTTP requests to the Issuer.</li>		can be used to construct HTTP requests to the Issuer.</dd>
	<li>Issuer Public Key: <tt>pkI</tt>, with a key identifier <tt>token_key		<dt>Issuer Public Key:</dt><dd><tt>pkI</tt>, with a key identifier <tt>t
	_id</tt> computed as		oken_key_id</tt> computed as
	described in <xref target="issuer-configuration"/>.</li>		described in <xref target="issuer-configuration"/>.</dd>
	<li>Challenge value: <tt>challenge</tt>, an opaque byte string. For exam		<dt>Challenge value:</dt><dd><tt>challenge</tt> -- an opaque byte string
	ple, this might		. For example, this might
	be provided by the redemption protocol in <xref target="AUTHSCHEME"/>.</li>		be provided by the redemption protocol described in <xref target="RFC9577"/>.</d
	</ul>		d>
			</dl>
	<t>Given this configuration and these inputs, the two messages exchanged i n		<t>Given this configuration and these inputs, the two messages exchanged i n
	this protocol are described below. This section uses notation described in		this protocol are described below. This section uses notation described in
	<xref section="4" sectionFormat="comma" target="OPRF"/>, including SerializeElem ent and DeserializeElement,		<xref section="4" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC9497"/>, including SerializeE lement and DeserializeElement,
	SerializeScalar and DeserializeScalar, and DeriveKeyPair.</t>		SerializeScalar and DeserializeScalar, and DeriveKeyPair.</t>
	<t>The constants <tt>Ne</tt> and <tt>Ns</tt> are as defined in <xref secti		<t>The constants <tt>Ne</tt> and <tt>Ns</tt> are as defined in
	on="4" sectionFormat="comma" target="OPRF"/> for		Section&nbsp;<xref target="RFC9497" section="4.4"
	OPRF(P-384, SHA-384). The constant <tt>Nk</tt>, which is also equal to <tt>Nh</t		sectionFormat="bare">"OPRF(P-384, SHA-384)"</xref> of <xref target="RFC9497"/>.
	t> as defined		For this protocol, the constant <tt>Nk</tt>, which is also equal to <tt>Nh</tt>
	in <xref section="4" sectionFormat="comma" target="OPRF"/>, is defined by <xref		as defined
	target="private-token-type"/>.</t>		in <xref section="4.4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9497"/>, is defined by <xre
			f target="private-token-type"/>.</t>
	<section anchor="private-request">		<section anchor="private-request">
	<name>Client-to-Issuer Request</name>		<name>Client-to-Issuer Request</name>
	<t>The Client first creates a context as follows:</t>		<t>The Client first creates a context as follows:</t>
	<artwork><![CDATA[		<artwork><![CDATA[
	client_context = SetupVOPRFClient("P384-SHA384", pkI)		client_context = SetupVOPRFClient("P384-SHA384", pkI)
	]]></artwork>		]]></artwork>
	<t>Here, "P384-SHA384" is the identifier corresponding to the		<t>Here, "P384-SHA384" is the identifier corresponding to the
	OPRF(P-384, SHA-384) ciphersuite in <xref target="OPRF"/>. SetupVOPRFClient		OPRF(P-384, SHA-384) ciphersuite defined in <xref target="RFC9497"/>. SetupVOPRF
	is defined in <xref section="3.2" sectionFormat="comma" target="OPRF"/>.</t>		Client
	<t>The Client then creates an issuance request message for a random 32-b		is defined in <xref section="3.2" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC9497"/>.</t>
	yte value <tt>nonce</tt>		<t>The Client then creates an issuance request message for a random 32-b
			yte <tt>nonce</tt>
	with the input challenge and Issuer key identifier as described below:</t>		with the input challenge and Issuer key identifier as described below:</t>
	<artwork><![CDATA[		<artwork><![CDATA[
	nonce = random(32)		nonce = random(32)
	challenge_digest = SHA256(challenge)		challenge_digest = SHA256(challenge)
	token_input = concat(0x0001, // Token type field is 2 bytes long		token_input = concat(0x0001, // token-type field is 2 bytes long
	nonce,		nonce,
	challenge_digest,		challenge_digest,
	token_key_id)		token_key_id)
	blind, blinded_element = client_context.Blind(token_input)		blind, blinded_element = client_context.Blind(token_input)
	]]></artwork>		]]></artwork>
	<t>The Blind function is defined in <xref section="3.3.2" sectionFormat=		<t>The Blind function is discussed in
	"comma" target="OPRF"/>.		Sections&nbsp;<xref target="RFC9497" section="3.3.1" sectionFormat="bare"/> and
			<xref target="RFC9497" section="3.3.2" sectionFormat="bare"/> of <xref target="R
			FC9497"/>.
	If the Blind function fails, the Client aborts the protocol.		If the Blind function fails, the Client aborts the protocol.
	The Client stores the <tt>nonce</tt> and <tt>challenge_digest</tt> values locall y		The Client stores the <tt>nonce</tt> and <tt>challenge_digest</tt> values locall y
	for use when finalizing the issuance protocol to produce a token		for use when finalizing the issuance protocol to produce a token
	(as described in <xref target="private-finalize"/>).</t>		(as described in <xref target="private-finalize"/>).</t>
	<t>The Client then creates a TokenRequest structured as follows:</t>		<t>The Client then creates a TokenRequest structured as follows:</t>
	<artwork><![CDATA[		<artwork><![CDATA[
	struct {		struct {
	uint16_t token_type = 0x0001; /* Type VOPRF(P-384, SHA-384) */		uint16_t token_type = 0x0001; /* Type VOPRF(P-384, SHA-384) */
	uint8_t truncated_token_key_id;		uint8_t truncated_token_key_id;
	uint8_t blinded_msg[Ne];		uint8_t blinded_msg[Ne];
	} TokenRequest;		} TokenRequest;
	]]></artwork>		]]></artwork>
	<t>The structure fields are defined as follows:</t>		<t>The structure fields are defined as follows:</t>
	<ul spacing="normal">		<ul spacing="normal">
	<li>"token_type" is a 2-octet integer, which matches the type in the c hallenge.</li>		<li>"token_type" is a 2-octet integer, which matches the type in the c hallenge.</li>
	<li>"truncated_token_key_id" is the least significant byte of the <tt> token_key_id</tt>		<li>"truncated_token_key_id" is the least significant byte of the <tt> token_key_id</tt>
	(<xref target="issuer-configuration"/>) in network byte order (in other words, t he last 8		(<xref target="issuer-configuration"/>) in network byte order (in other words, t he last 8
	bits of <tt>token_key_id</tt>). This value is truncated so that Issuers cannot u se		bits of <tt>token_key_id</tt>). This value is truncated so that Issuers cannot u se
	<tt>token_key_id</tt> as a way of uniquely identifying Clients; see <xref target		<tt>token_key_id</tt> as a way of uniquely identifying Clients; see referenced i
	="security"/>		nformation from <xref target="security"/> for more details.</li>
	and referenced information for more details.</li>
	<li>"blinded_msg" is the Ne-octet blinded message defined above, compu ted as		<li>"blinded_msg" is the Ne-octet blinded message defined above, compu ted as
	<tt>SerializeElement(blinded_element)</tt>.</li>		<tt>SerializeElement(blinded_element)</tt>.</li>
	</ul>		</ul>
	<t>The values <tt>token_input</tt> and <tt>blinded_element</tt> are stor		<t>The values <tt>token_input</tt> and <tt>blinded_element</tt> are stor
	ed locally and used		ed locally for use
	later as described in <xref target="private-finalize"/>. The Client then generat		when finalizing the issuance protocol to produce a token (as described in <xref
	es an HTTP		target="private-finalize"/>). The Client then generates an HTTP
	POST request to send to the Issuer Request URL, with the TokenRequest as the		POST request to send to the Issuer Request URL, with the TokenRequest as the
	content. The media type for this request is		content. The media type for this request is
	"application/private-token-request". An example request for the Issuer Request U RL		"application/private-token-request". An example request for the Issuer Request U RL
	"https://issuer.example.net/request" is shown below.</t>		"https://issuer.example.net/request" is shown below.</t>
	<artwork><![CDATA[		<sourcecode name="" type="http-message"><![CDATA[
	POST /request HTTP/1.1		POST /request HTTP/1.1
	Host: issuer.example.net		Host: issuer.example.net
	Accept: application/private-token-response		Accept: application/private-token-response
	Content-Type: application/private-token-request		Content-Type: application/private-token-request
	Content-Length: <Length of TokenRequest>		Content-Length: <Length of TokenRequest>
	<Bytes containing the TokenRequest>		<Bytes containing the TokenRequest>
	]]></artwork>		]]></sourcecode>
	</section>		</section>
	<section anchor="private-response">		<section anchor="private-response">
	<name>Issuer-to-Client Response</name>		<name>Issuer-to-Client Response</name>
	<t>Upon receipt of the request, the Issuer validates the following condi tions:</t>		<t>Upon receipt of the request, the Issuer validates the following condi tions:</t>
	<ul spacing="normal">		<ul spacing="normal">
	<li>The TokenRequest contains a supported token_type.</li>		<li>The TokenRequest contains a supported token_type.</li>
	<li>The TokenRequest.truncated_token_key_id corresponds to the truncat ed key ID		<li>The TokenRequest.truncated_token_key_id corresponds to the truncat ed key ID
	of a Public Key owned by the Issuer.</li>		of a public key owned by the Issuer.</li>
	<li>The TokenRequest.blinded_msg is of the correct size.</li>		<li>The TokenRequest.blinded_msg is of the correct size.</li>
	</ul>		</ul>
	<t>If any of these conditions is not met, the Issuer MUST return an HTTP		<t>If any of these conditions are not met, the Issuer <bcp14>MUST</bcp14
	422		> return an HTTP 422
	(Unprocessable Content) error to the client.</t>		(Unprocessable Content) error to the Client.</t>
	<t>If these conditions are met, the Issuer then tries to deserialize		<t>If these conditions are met, the Issuer then tries to deserialize
	TokenRequest.blinded_msg using DeserializeElement from		TokenRequest.blinded_msg using DeserializeElement
	<xref section="2.1" sectionFormat="of" target="OPRF"/>, yielding <tt>blinded_ele		(<xref section="2.1" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC9497"/>), yielding <tt>bli
	ment</tt>. If this fails, the		nded_element</tt>. If this fails, the
	Issuer MUST return an HTTP 422 (Unprocessable Content) error to the		Issuer <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> return an HTTP 422 (Unprocessable Content) error to t
	client. Otherwise, if the Issuer is willing to produce a token to the Client,		he
			Client. Otherwise, if the Issuer is willing to produce a token to the Client,
	the Issuer completes the issuance flow by computing a blinded response as		the Issuer completes the issuance flow by computing a blinded response as
	follows:</t>		follows:</t>
	<artwork><![CDATA[		<artwork><![CDATA[
	server_context = SetupVOPRFServer("P384-SHA384", skI)		server_context = SetupVOPRFServer("P384-SHA384", skI)
	evaluate_element, proof =		evaluate_element, proof =
	server_context.BlindEvaluate(skI, pkI, blinded_element)		server_context.BlindEvaluate(skI, pkI, blinded_element)
	]]></artwork>		]]></artwork>
	<t>SetupVOPRFServer is defined in <xref section="3.2" sectionFormat="com		<t>SetupVOPRFServer is defined in <xref section="3.2" sectionFormat="com
	ma" target="OPRF"/> and BlindEvaluate is		ma" target="RFC9497"/>, and BlindEvaluate is
	defined in <xref section="3.3.2" sectionFormat="comma" target="OPRF"/>. The Issu		defined in <xref section="3.3.2" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC9497"/>. The I
	er then creates a TokenResponse		ssuer then creates a TokenResponse
	structured as follows:</t>		structured as follows:</t>
	<artwork><![CDATA[		<artwork><![CDATA[
	struct {		struct {
	uint8_t evaluate_msg[Ne];		uint8_t evaluate_msg[Ne];
	uint8_t evaluate_proof[Ns+Ns];		uint8_t evaluate_proof[Ns+Ns];
	} TokenResponse;		} TokenResponse;
	]]></artwork>		]]></artwork>
	<t>The structure fields are defined as follows:</t>		<t>The structure fields are defined as follows:</t>
	<ul spacing="normal">		<ul spacing="normal">
	<li>"evaluate_msg" is the Ne-octet evaluated message, computed as		<li>"evaluate_msg" is the Ne-octet evaluated message, computed as
	<tt>SerializeElement(evaluate_element)</tt>.</li>		<tt>SerializeElement(evaluate_element)</tt>.</li>
	<li>"evaluate_proof" is the (Ns+Ns)-octet serialized proof, which is a pair of		<li>"evaluate_proof" is the (Ns+Ns)-octet serialized proof, which is a pair of
	Scalar values, computed as		Scalar values, computed as
	<tt>concat(SerializeScalar(proof[0]), SerializeScalar(proof[1]))</tt>.</li>		<tt>concat(SerializeScalar(proof[0]), SerializeScalar(proof[1]))</tt>.</li>
	</ul>		</ul>
	<t>The Issuer generates an HTTP response with status code 200 whose cont ent		<t>The Issuer generates an HTTP response with status code 200 whose cont ent
	consists of TokenResponse, with the content type set as		consists of TokenResponse, with the content type set as
	"application/private-token-response".</t>		"application/private-token-response".</t>
	<artwork><![CDATA[		<sourcecode name="" type="http-message"><![CDATA[
	HTTP/1.1 200 OK		HTTP/1.1 200 OK
	Content-Type: application/private-token-response		Content-Type: application/private-token-response
	Content-Length: <Length of TokenResponse>		Content-Length: <Length of TokenResponse>
	<Bytes containing the TokenResponse>		<Bytes containing the TokenResponse>
	]]></artwork>		]]></sourcecode>
	</section>		</section>
	<section anchor="private-finalize">		<section anchor="private-finalize">
	<name>Finalization</name>		<name>Finalization</name>
	<t>Upon receipt, the Client handles the response and, if successful, des erializes		<t>Upon receipt, the Client handles the response and, if successful, des erializes
	the content values TokenResponse.evaluate_msg and TokenResponse.evaluate_proof,		the content values TokenResponse.evaluate_msg and TokenResponse.evaluate_proof,
	yielding <tt>evaluated_element</tt> and <tt>proof</tt>. If deserialization of ei ther value		yielding <tt>evaluated_element</tt> and <tt>proof</tt>. If deserialization of ei ther value
	fails, the Client aborts the protocol. Otherwise, the Client processes the		fails, the Client aborts the protocol. Otherwise, the Client processes the
	response as follows:</t>		response as follows:</t>
	<artwork><![CDATA[		<artwork><![CDATA[
	authenticator = client_context.Finalize(token_input, blind,		authenticator = client_context.Finalize(token_input, blind,
	evaluated_element,		evaluated_element,
	blinded_element,		blinded_element,
	proof)		proof)
	]]></artwork>		]]></artwork>
	<t>The Finalize function is defined in <xref section="3.3.2" sectionForm		<t>The Finalize function is defined in <xref section="3.3.2" sectionForm
	at="comma" target="OPRF"/>. If this		at="comma" target="RFC9497"/>. If this
	succeeds, the Client then constructs a Token as follows:</t>		succeeds, the Client then constructs a token as follows:</t>
	<artwork><![CDATA[		<artwork><![CDATA[
	struct {		struct {
	uint16_t token_type = 0x0001; /* Type VOPRF(P-384, SHA-384) */		uint16_t token_type = 0x0001; /* Type VOPRF(P-384, SHA-384) */
	uint8_t nonce[32];		uint8_t nonce[32];
	uint8_t challenge_digest[32];		uint8_t challenge_digest[32];
	uint8_t token_key_id[32];		uint8_t token_key_id[32];
	uint8_t authenticator[Nk];		uint8_t authenticator[Nk];
	} Token;		} Token;
	]]></artwork>		]]></artwork>
	<t>The Token.nonce value is that which was created in <xref target="priv ate-request"/>.		<t>The Token.nonce value is the value that was created according to <xre f target="token-verification"/>.
	If the Finalize function fails, the Client aborts the protocol.</t>		If the Finalize function fails, the Client aborts the protocol.</t>
	</section>		</section>
	<section anchor="token-verification">		<section anchor="token-verification">
	<name>Token Verification</name>		<name>Token Verification</name>
	<t>Verifying a Token requires creating a VOPRF context using the Issuer Private		<t>Verifying a token requires creating a Verifiable Oblivious Pseudorand om Function (VOPRF) context using the Issuer Private
	Key and Public Key, evaluating the token contents, and comparing the result		Key and Public Key, evaluating the token contents, and comparing the result
	against the token authenticator value:</t>		against the token authenticator value:</t>
	<artwork><![CDATA[		<artwork><![CDATA[
	server_context = SetupVOPRFServer("P384-SHA384", skI)		server_context = SetupVOPRFServer("P384-SHA384", skI)
	token_authenticator_input =		token_authenticator_input =
	concat(Token.token_type,		concat(Token.token_type,
	Token.nonce,		Token.nonce,
	Token.challenge_digest,		Token.challenge_digest,
	Token.token_key_id)		Token.token_key_id)
	token_authenticator =		token_authenticator =
	server_context.Evaluate(token_authenticator_input)		server_context.Evaluate(token_authenticator_input)
	valid = (token_authenticator == Token.authenticator)		valid = (token_authenticator == Token.authenticator)
	]]></artwork>		]]></artwork>
	</section>		</section>
	<section anchor="issuer-configuration">		<section anchor="issuer-configuration">
	<name>Issuer Configuration</name>		<name>Issuer Configuration</name>
	<t>Issuers are configured with Issuer Private and Public Keys, each deno		<t>Issuers are configured with Issuer Private Keys and Public Keys, each
	ted <tt>skI</tt>		denoted <tt>skI</tt>
	and <tt>pkI</tt>, respectively, used to produce tokens. These keys MUST NOT be r		and <tt>pkI</tt>, respectively, used to produce tokens. These keys <bcp14>MUST N
	eused		OT</bcp14> be reused
	in other protocols. A RECOMMENDED method for generating keys is as		in other protocols. A <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> method for generating keys is a
			s
	follows:</t>		follows:</t>
	<artwork><![CDATA[		<artwork><![CDATA[
	seed = random(Ns)		seed = random(Ns)
	(skI, pkI) = DeriveKeyPair(seed, "PrivacyPass")		(skI, pkI) = DeriveKeyPair(seed, "PrivacyPass")
	]]></artwork>		]]></artwork>
	<t>The DeriveKeyPair function is defined in <xref section="3.3.1" sectio nFormat="comma" target="OPRF"/>.		<t>The DeriveKeyPair function is defined in <xref section="3.2.1" sectio nFormat="comma" target="RFC9497"/>.
	The key identifier for a public key <tt>pkI</tt>, denoted <tt>token_key_id</tt>, is computed		The key identifier for a public key <tt>pkI</tt>, denoted <tt>token_key_id</tt>, is computed
	as follows:</t>		as follows:</t>
	<artwork><![CDATA[		<artwork><![CDATA[
	token_key_id = SHA256(SerializeElement(pkI))		token_key_id = SHA256(SerializeElement(pkI))
	]]></artwork>		]]></artwork>
	<t>Since Clients truncate <tt>token_key_id</tt> in each <tt>TokenRequest		<t>Since Clients truncate <tt>token_key_id</tt> in each <tt>TokenRequest
	</tt>, Issuers SHOULD		</tt>, Issuers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>
	ensure that the truncated form of new key IDs do not collide with other		ensure that the truncated forms of new key IDs do not collide with other
	truncated key IDs in rotation. Collisions can cause the Issuer to use		truncated key IDs in rotation. Collisions can cause the Issuer to use
	the wrong Issuer Private Key for issuance, which will in turn cause the		the wrong Issuer Private Key for issuance, which will in turn cause the
	resulting tokens to be invalid. There is no known security consequence of		resulting tokens to be invalid. There is no known security consequence of
	using the the wrong Issuer Private Key. A possible exception to this constraint		using the wrong Issuer Private Key. &nbsp;A possible exception to this constrain
	would be a colliding key that is still in use but in the process of being		t
	rotated out, in which case the collision cannot reasonably be avoided but it		would be a colliding key that is still in use but is in the process of being
	is expected to be transient.</t>		rotated out, in which case the collision cannot reasonably be avoided; however,
			this situation is expected to be transient.</t>
	</section>		</section>
	</section>		</section>
	<section anchor="public-flow">		<section anchor="public-flow">
	<name>Issuance Protocol for Publicly Verifiable Tokens</name>		<name>Issuance Protocol for Publicly Verifiable Tokens</name>
	<t>This section describes a variant of the issuance protocol in <xref targ		<t>This section describes a variant of the issuance protocol discussed in
	et="private-flow"/>		<xref target="private-flow"/>
	for producing publicly verifiable tokens using the protocol in <xref target="BLI		for producing publicly verifiable tokens using the protocol defined in <xref tar
	NDRSA"/>.		get="RFC9474"/>.
	In particular, this variant of the issuance protocol works for the		In particular, this variant of the issuance protocol works for the
	RSABSSA-SHA384-PSS-Deterministic and RSABSSA-SHA384-PSSZERO-Deterministic		RSABSSA-SHA384-PSS-Deterministic and RSABSSA-SHA384-PSSZERO-Deterministic
	blind RSA protocol variants described in <xref section="5" sectionFormat="of" ta		blind RSA protocol variants described in <xref section="5" sectionFormat="of" ta
	rget="BLINDRSA"/>.</t>		rget="RFC9474"/>.</t>
	<t>The publicly verifiable issuance protocol differs from the protocol in		<t>The publicly verifiable issuance protocol differs from the protocol def
			ined in
	<xref target="private-flow"/> in that the output tokens are publicly verifiable by anyone		<xref target="private-flow"/> in that the output tokens are publicly verifiable by anyone
	with the Issuer Public Key. This means any Origin can select a given Issuer to		with the Issuer Public Key. &nbsp;This means any Origin can select a given Issue
	produce tokens, as long as the Origin has the Issuer public key, without		r to
			produce tokens, as long as the Origin has the Issuer Public Key, without
	explicit coordination or permission from the Issuer. This is because the Issuer		explicit coordination or permission from the Issuer. This is because the Issuer
	does not learn the Origin that requested the token during the issuance protocol. </t>		does not learn the Origin that requested the token during the issuance protocol. </t>
	<t>Beyond this difference, the publicly verifiable issuance protocol varia nt is		<t>Beyond this difference, the publicly verifiable issuance protocol varia nt is
	nearly identical to the privately verifiable issuance protocol variant. In		nearly identical to the privately verifiable issuance protocol variant. In
	particular, Issuers provide an Issuer Private and Public Key, denoted skI and pk I,		particular, Issuers provide an Issuer Private Key and Public Key, denoted skI an d pkI,
	respectively, used to produce tokens as input to the protocol. See		respectively, used to produce tokens as input to the protocol. See
	<xref target="public-issuer-configuration"/> for how these keys are generated.</ t>		<xref target="public-issuer-configuration"/> for information about how these key s are generated.</t>
	<t>Clients provide the following as input to the issuance protocol:</t>		<t>Clients provide the following as input to the issuance protocol:</t>
	<ul spacing="normal">		<dl spacing="normal">
	<li>Issuer Request URL: A URL identifying the location to which issuance		<dt>Issuer Request URL:</dt><dd>A URL identifying the location to which
	requests		issuance requests
	are sent. This can be a URL derived from the "issuer-request-uri" value in the		are sent. This can be a URL derived from the "issuer-request-uri" value in the
	Issuer's directory resource, or it can be another Client-configured URL. The val ue		Issuer's directory resource, or it can be another Client-configured URL. The val ue
	of this parameter depends on the Client configuration and deployment model.		of this parameter depends on the Client configuration and deployment model.
	For example, in the 'Split Origin, Attester, Issuer' deployment model, the		For example, in the "Split Origin, Attester, Issuer" deployment model (<xref tar get="RFC9576" sectionFormat="comma" section="4.4"/>), the
	Issuer Request URL might correspond to the Client's configured Attester,		Issuer Request URL might correspond to the Client's configured Attester,
	and the Attester is configured to relay requests to the Issuer.</li>		and the Attester is configured to relay requests to the Issuer.</dd>
	<li>Issuer name: An identifier for the Issuer. This is typically a host		<dt>Issuer name:</dt><dd>An identifier for the Issuer. This is typically
	name that		a hostname that
	can be used to construct HTTP requests to the Issuer.</li>		can be used to construct HTTP requests to the Issuer.</dd>
	<li>Issuer Public Key: <tt>pkI</tt>, with a key identifier <tt>token_key		<dt>Issuer Public Key:</dt><dd><tt>pkI</tt>, with a key identifier <tt>t
	_id</tt> computed as		oken_key_id</tt> computed as
	described in <xref target="public-issuer-configuration"/>.</li>		described in <xref target="public-issuer-configuration"/>.</dd>
	<li>Challenge value: <tt>challenge</tt>, an opaque byte string. For exam		<dt>Challenge value:</dt><dd><tt>challenge</tt> -- an opaque byte string
	ple, this might		. For example, this might
	be provided by the redemption protocol in <xref target="AUTHSCHEME"/>.</li>		be provided by the redemption protocol described in <xref target="RFC9577"/>.</d
	</ul>		d>
			</dl>
	<t>Given this configuration and these inputs, the two messages exchanged i n		<t>Given this configuration and these inputs, the two messages exchanged i n
	this protocol are described below. The constant <tt>Nk</tt> is defined by		this protocol are described below. For this protocol, the constant <tt>Nk</tt> i s defined by
	<xref target="public-token-type"/>.</t>		<xref target="public-token-type"/>.</t>
	<section anchor="public-request">		<section anchor="public-request">
	<name>Client-to-Issuer Request</name>		<name>Client-to-Issuer Request</name>
	<t>The Client first creates an issuance request message for a random 32- byte value		<t>The Client first creates an issuance request message for a random 32- byte
	<tt>nonce</tt> using the input challenge and Issuer key identifier as follows:</ t>		<tt>nonce</tt> using the input challenge and Issuer key identifier as follows:</ t>
	<artwork><![CDATA[		<artwork><![CDATA[
	nonce = random(32)		nonce = random(32)
	challenge_digest = SHA256(challenge)		challenge_digest = SHA256(challenge)
	token_input = concat(0x0002, // Token type field is 2 bytes long		token_input = concat(0x0002, // token-type field is 2 bytes long
	nonce,		nonce,
	challenge_digest,		challenge_digest,
	token_key_id)		token_key_id)
	blinded_msg, blind_inv =		blinded_msg, blind_inv =
	Blind(pkI, PrepareIdentity(token_input))		Blind(pkI, PrepareIdentity(token_input))
	]]></artwork>		]]></artwork>
	<t>The PrepareIdentity and Blind functions are defined in		<t>The PrepareIdentity and Blind functions are defined in
	<xref section="4.1" sectionFormat="of" target="BLINDRSA"/> and <xref section="4. 2" sectionFormat="of" target="BLINDRSA"/>, respectively.		Sections&nbsp;<xref target="RFC9474" section="4.1" sectionFormat="bare"/> and <x ref target="RFC9474" section="4.2" sectionFormat="bare"/> of <xref target="RFC94 74"/>, respectively.
	The Client stores the nonce and challenge_digest values locally for use		The Client stores the nonce and challenge_digest values locally for use
	when finalizing the issuance protocol to produce a token (as described		when finalizing the issuance protocol to produce a token (as described
	in <xref target="public-finalize"/>).</t>		in <xref target="public-finalize"/>).</t>
	<t>The Client then creates a TokenRequest structured as follows:</t>		<t>The Client then creates a TokenRequest structured as follows:</t>
	<artwork><![CDATA[		<artwork><![CDATA[
	struct {		struct {
	uint16_t token_type = 0x0002; /* Type Blind RSA (2048-bit) */		uint16_t token_type = 0x0002; /* Type Blind RSA (2048-bit) */
	uint8_t truncated_token_key_id;		uint8_t truncated_token_key_id;
	uint8_t blinded_msg[Nk];		uint8_t blinded_msg[Nk];
	} TokenRequest;		} TokenRequest;
	]]></artwork>		]]></artwork>
	<t>The structure fields are defined as follows:</t>		<t>The structure fields are defined as follows:</t>
	<ul spacing="normal">		<ul spacing="normal">
	<li>"token_type" is a 2-octet integer, which matches the type in the c hallenge.</li>		<li>"token_type" is a 2-octet integer, which matches the type in the c hallenge.</li>
	<li>"truncated_token_key_id" is the least significant byte of the <tt> token_key_id</tt>		<li>"truncated_token_key_id" is the least significant byte of the <tt> token_key_id</tt>
	(<xref target="public-issuer-configuration"/>) in network byte order (in other w ords, the		(<xref target="public-issuer-configuration"/>) in network byte order (in other w ords, the
	last 8 bits of <tt>token_key_id</tt>). This value is truncated so that Issuers c annot use		last 8 bits of <tt>token_key_id</tt>). This value is truncated so that Issuers c annot use
	<tt>token_key_id</tt> as a way of uniquely identifying Clients; see <xref target		<tt>token_key_id</tt> as a way of uniquely identifying Clients; see referenced i
	="security"/>		nformation from <xref target="security"/> for more details.</li>
	and referenced information for more details.</li>
	<li>"blinded_msg" is the Nk-octet request defined above.</li>		<li>"blinded_msg" is the Nk-octet request defined above.</li>
	</ul>		</ul>
	<t>The Client then generates an HTTP POST request to send to the Issuer Request		<t>The Client then generates an HTTP POST request to send to the Issuer Request
	URL, with the TokenRequest as the content. The media type for this request		URL, with the TokenRequest as the content. The media type for this request
	is "application/private-token-request". An example request for the Issuer		is "application/private-token-request". An example request for the Issuer
	Request URL "https://issuer.example.net/request" is shown below.</t>		Request URL "https://issuer.example.net/request" is shown below.</t>
	<artwork><![CDATA[		<sourcecode name="" type="http-message"><![CDATA[
	POST /request HTTP/1.1		POST /request HTTP/1.1
	Host: issuer.example.net		Host: issuer.example.net
	Accept: application/private-token-response		Accept: application/private-token-response
	Content-Type: application/private-token-request		Content-Type: application/private-token-request
	Content-Length: <Length of TokenRequest>		Content-Length: <Length of TokenRequest>
	<Bytes containing the TokenRequest>		<Bytes containing the TokenRequest>
	]]></artwork>		]]></sourcecode>
	</section>		</section>
	<section anchor="public-response">		<section anchor="public-response">
	<name>Issuer-to-Client Response</name>		<name>Issuer-to-Client Response</name>
	<t>Upon receipt of the request, the Issuer validates the following condi tions:</t>		<t>Upon receipt of the request, the Issuer validates the following condi tions:</t>
	<ul spacing="normal">		<ul spacing="normal">
	<li>The TokenRequest contains a supported token_type.</li>		<li>The TokenRequest contains a supported token_type.</li>
	<li>The TokenRequest.truncated_token_key_id corresponds to the truncat ed key		<li>The TokenRequest.truncated_token_key_id corresponds to the truncat ed key
	ID of an Issuer Public Key.</li>		ID of an Issuer Public Key.</li>
	<li>The TokenRequest.blinded_msg is of the correct size.</li>		<li>The TokenRequest.blinded_msg is of the correct size.</li>
	</ul>		</ul>
	<t>If any of these conditions is not met, the Issuer MUST return an HTTP 422		<t>If any of these conditions are not met, the Issuer <bcp14>MUST</bcp14 > return an HTTP 422
	(Unprocessable Content) error to the Client. Otherwise, if the		(Unprocessable Content) error to the Client. Otherwise, if the
	Issuer is willing to produce a token to the Client, the Issuer		Issuer is willing to produce a token to the Client, the Issuer
	completes the issuance flow by computing a blinded response as follows:</t>		completes the issuance flow by computing a blinded response as follows:</t>
	<artwork><![CDATA[		<artwork><![CDATA[
	blind_sig = BlindSign(skI, TokenRequest.blinded_msg)		blind_sig = BlindSign(skI, TokenRequest.blinded_msg)
	]]></artwork>		]]></artwork>
	<t>The BlindSign function is defined in <xref section="4.3" sectionForma		<t>The BlindSign function is defined in <xref section="4.3" sectionForma
	t="of" target="BLINDRSA"/>.		t="of" target="RFC9474"/>.
	The result is encoded and transmitted to the client in the following		The result is encoded and transmitted to the Client in the following
	TokenResponse structure:</t>		TokenResponse structure:</t>
	<artwork><![CDATA[		<artwork><![CDATA[
	struct {		struct {
	uint8_t blind_sig[Nk];		uint8_t blind_sig[Nk];
	} TokenResponse;		} TokenResponse;
	]]></artwork>		]]></artwork>
	<t>The Issuer generates an HTTP response with status code 200 whose cont ent		<t>The Issuer generates an HTTP response with status code 200 whose cont ent
	consists of TokenResponse, with the content type set as		consists of TokenResponse, with the content type set as
	"application/private-token-response".</t>		"application/private-token-response".</t>
	<artwork><![CDATA[		<sourcecode name="" type="http-message"><![CDATA[
	HTTP/1.1 200 OK		HTTP/1.1 200 OK
	Content-Type: application/private-token-response		Content-Type: application/private-token-response
	Content-Length: <Length of TokenResponse>		Content-Length: <Length of TokenResponse>
	<Bytes containing the TokenResponse>		<Bytes containing the TokenResponse>
	]]></artwork>		]]></sourcecode>
	</section>		</section>
	<section anchor="public-finalize">		<section anchor="public-finalize">
	<name>Finalization</name>		<name>Finalization</name>
	<t>Upon receipt, the Client handles the response and, if successful, pro cesses the		<t>Upon receipt, the Client handles the response and, if successful, pro cesses the
	content as follows:</t>		content as follows:</t>
	<artwork><![CDATA[		<artwork><![CDATA[
	authenticator =		authenticator =
	Finalize(pkI, nonce, blind_sig, blind_inv)		Finalize(pkI, nonce, blind_sig, blind_inv)
	]]></artwork>		]]></artwork>
	<t>The Finalize function is defined in <xref section="4.4" sectionFormat		<t>The Finalize function is defined in <xref section="4.4" sectionFormat
	="of" target="BLINDRSA"/>. If this		="of" target="RFC9474"/>. If this
	succeeds, the Client then constructs a Token as described in <xref target="AUTHS		succeeds, the Client then constructs a token as described in <xref target="RFC95
	CHEME"/> as		77"/> as
	follows:</t>		follows:</t>
	<artwork><![CDATA[		<artwork><![CDATA[
	struct {		struct {
	uint16_t token_type = 0x0002; /* Type Blind RSA (2048-bit) */		uint16_t token_type = 0x0002; /* Type Blind RSA (2048-bit) */
	uint8_t nonce[32];		uint8_t nonce[32];
	uint8_t challenge_digest[32];		uint8_t challenge_digest[32];
	uint8_t token_key_id[32];		uint8_t token_key_id[32];
	uint8_t authenticator[Nk];		uint8_t authenticator[Nk];
	} Token;		} Token;
	]]></artwork>		]]></artwork>
	<t>The Token.nonce value is that which was sampled in <xref target="priv ate-request"/>.		<t>The Token.nonce value is the value that was sampled according to <xre f target="public-request"/>.
	If the Finalize function fails, the Client aborts the protocol.</t>		If the Finalize function fails, the Client aborts the protocol.</t>
	</section>		</section>
	<section anchor="token-verification-1">		<section anchor="token-verification-1">
	<name>Token Verification</name>		<name>Token Verification</name>
	<t>Verifying a Token requires checking that Token.authenticator is a val		<t>Verifying a token requires checking that Token.authenticator is a val
	id		id
	signature over the remainder of the token input using the Issuer Public Key.		signature over the remainder of the token input using the Issuer Public
	The function <tt>RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY</tt> is defined in <xref section="8.1.2" sect		Key. &nbsp;The function <tt>RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY</tt> is defined in <xref section="
	ionFormat="of" target="RFC8017"/>,		8.1.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8017"/>,
	using SHA-384 as the Hash function, MGF1 with SHA-384 as the PSS mask		using SHA-384 as the hash function, MGF1 with SHA-384 as the Probabilistic Signa
			ture Scheme (PSS) mask
	generation function (MGF), and a 48-byte salt length (sLen).</t>		generation function (MGF), and a 48-byte salt length (sLen).</t>
	<artwork><![CDATA[		<artwork><![CDATA[
	token_authenticator_input =		token_authenticator_input =
	concat(Token.token_type,		concat(Token.token_type,
	Token.nonce,		Token.nonce,
	Token.challenge_digest,		Token.challenge_digest,
	Token.token_key_id)		Token.token_key_id)
	valid = RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY(pkI,		valid = RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY(pkI,
	token_authenticator_input,		token_authenticator_input,
	Token.authenticator)		Token.authenticator)
	]]></artwork>		]]></artwork>
	</section>		</section>
	<section anchor="public-issuer-configuration">		<section anchor="public-issuer-configuration">
	<name>Issuer Configuration</name>		<name>Issuer Configuration</name>
	<t>Issuers are configured with Issuer Private and Public Keys, each deno		<t>Issuers are configured with Issuer Private Keys and Public Keys, each
	ted skI and		denoted skI and
	pkI, respectively, used to produce tokens. Each key SHALL be generated		pkI, respectively, used to produce tokens. Each key <bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be gene
	securely, for example as specified in FIPS 186-5 <xref target="DSS"/>.		rated
	These keys MUST NOT be reused in other protocols.</t>		securely -- for example, as specified in FIPS 186-5 <xref target="DSS"/>.
	<t>The key identifier for an Issuer Private and Public Key (skI, pkI),		These keys <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be reused in other protocols.</t>
			<t>The key identifier for an Issuer Private Key and Public Key (skI, pkI
			),
	denoted <tt>token_key_id</tt>, is computed as SHA256(encoded_key), where encoded _key		denoted <tt>token_key_id</tt>, is computed as SHA256(encoded_key), where encoded _key
	is a DER-encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo <xref target="RFC5280"/> (SPKI) object car		is a DER-encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo (SPKI) object <xref target="RFC5280"/>
	rying pkI		carrying pkI
	as a DER-encoded RSAPublicKey value <xref target="RFC5756"/> in the subjectPubli cKey		as a DER-encoded RSAPublicKey value <xref target="RFC5756"/> in the subjectPubli cKey
	field. Additionally, the SPKI object MUST use the id-RSASSA-PSS object		field. Additionally, (1)&nbsp;the SPKI object <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use the id-RSA
	identifier in the algorithm field within the SPKI object, the parameters field		SSA-PSS object
	MUST contain a RSASSA-PSS-params value, and MUST include the hashAlgorithm,		identifier in the algorithm field within the SPKI object and (2)&nbsp;the parame
	maskGenAlgorithm, and saltLength values. The saltLength MUST match the output		ters field
			<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain an RSASSA-PSS-params value and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> i
			nclude the hashAlgorithm,
			maskGenAlgorithm, and saltLength values. The saltLength <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> matc
			h the output
	size of the hash function associated with the public key and token type.</t>		size of the hash function associated with the public key and token type.</t>
	<t>An example sequence of the SPKI object (in ASN.1 format, with the act ual public key		<t>An example sequence of the SPKI object (in ASN.1 format, with the act ual public key
	bytes truncated) for a 2048-bit key is below:</t>		bytes truncated) for a 2048-bit key is shown below:</t>
	<artwork><![CDATA[		<artwork><![CDATA[
	$ cat spki.bin | xxd -r -p | openssl asn1parse -dump -inform DER		$ cat spki.bin | xxd -r -p | openssl asn1parse -dump -inform DER
	0:d=0 hl=4 l= 338 cons: SEQUENCE		0:d=0 hl=4 l= 338 cons: SEQUENCE
	4:d=1 hl=2 l= 61 cons: SEQUENCE		4:d=1 hl=2 l= 61 cons: SEQUENCE
	6:d=2 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :rsassaPss		6:d=2 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :rsassaPss
	17:d=2 hl=2 l= 48 cons: SEQUENCE		17:d=2 hl=2 l= 48 cons: SEQUENCE
	19:d=3 hl=2 l= 13 cons: cont [ 0 ]		19:d=3 hl=2 l= 13 cons: cont [ 0 ]
	21:d=4 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SEQUENCE		21:d=4 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SEQUENCE
	23:d=5 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :sha384		23:d=5 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :sha384
	34:d=3 hl=2 l= 26 cons: cont [ 1 ]		34:d=3 hl=2 l= 26 cons: cont [ 1 ]
	36:d=4 hl=2 l= 24 cons: SEQUENCE		36:d=4 hl=2 l= 24 cons: SEQUENCE
	38:d=5 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :mgf1		38:d=5 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :mgf1
	49:d=5 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SEQUENCE		49:d=5 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SEQUENCE
	51:d=6 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :sha384		51:d=6 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :sha384
	62:d=3 hl=2 l= 3 cons: cont [ 2 ]		62:d=3 hl=2 l= 3 cons: cont [ 2 ]
	64:d=4 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :30		64:d=4 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :30
	67:d=1 hl=4 l= 271 prim: BIT STRING		67:d=1 hl=4 l= 271 prim: BIT STRING
	... truncated public key bytes ...		... truncated public key bytes ...
	]]></artwork>		]]></artwork>
	<t>Since Clients truncate <tt>token_key_id</tt> in each <tt>TokenRequest		<t>Since Clients truncate <tt>token_key_id</tt> in each <tt>TokenRequest
	</tt>, Issuers SHOULD		</tt>, Issuers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>
	ensure that the truncated form of new key IDs do not collide with other		ensure that the truncated forms of new key IDs do not collide with other
	truncated key IDs in rotation. Collisions can cause the Issuer to use		truncated key IDs in rotation. Collisions can cause the Issuer to use
	the wrong Issuer Private Key for issuance, which will in turn cause the		the wrong Issuer Private Key for issuance, which will in turn cause the
	resulting tokens to be invalid. There is no known security consequence of		resulting tokens to be invalid. There is no known security consequence of
	using the the wrong Issuer Private Key. A possible exception to this constraint		using the wrong Issuer Private Key. &nbsp;A possible exception to this constrain
	would be a colliding key that is still in use but in the process of being		t
	rotated out, in which case the collision cannot reasonably be avoided but it		would be a colliding key that is still in use but is in the process of being
	is expected to be transient.</t>		rotated out, in which case the collision cannot reasonably be avoided; however,
			this
			situation is expected to be transient.</t>
	</section>		</section>
	</section>		</section>
	<section anchor="security">		<section anchor="security">
	<name>Security considerations</name>		<name>Security Considerations</name>
	<t>This document outlines how to instantiate the Issuance protocol		<t>This document outlines how to instantiate the issuance protocol
	based on the VOPRF defined in <xref target="OPRF"/> and blind RSA protocol defin		based on the VOPRF defined in <xref target="RFC9497"/> and the blind RSA protoco
	ed in		l defined in
	<xref target="BLINDRSA"/>. All security considerations described in the VOPRF an		<xref target="RFC9474"/>. All security considerations described in the VOPRF and
	d blind RSA		blind RSA
	documents also apply in the Privacy Pass use-case. Considerations related to		documents also apply in the Privacy Pass use case. Considerations related to
	broader privacy and security concerns in a multi-Client and multi-Issuer		broader privacy and security concerns in a multi-Client and multi-Issuer
	setting are deferred to the architecture document <xref target="ARCHITECTURE"/>.		setting are covered in the architecture document <xref target="RFC9576"/>. In
	In		particular, Sections&nbsp;<xref target="RFC9576" section="4" sectionFormat="bare
	particular, Section <xref target="ARCHITECTURE" section="4" sectionFormat="bare"		"/> and <xref target="RFC9576" section="5" sectionFormat="bare"/> of <xref targe
	/> and Section <xref target="ARCHITECTURE" section="5" sectionFormat="bare"/> of		t="RFC9576"/> discuss
	<xref target="ARCHITECTURE"/> discuss
	relevant privacy considerations influenced by the Privacy Pass deployment		relevant privacy considerations influenced by the Privacy Pass deployment
	model, and <xref section="6" sectionFormat="of" target="ARCHITECTURE"/> discusse s privacy considerations that		models, and <xref section="6" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9576"/> discusses pr ivacy considerations that
	apply regardless of deployment model. Notable considerations include those perta ining to		apply regardless of deployment model. Notable considerations include those perta ining to
	Issuer Public Key rotation and consistency, where consistency is as described		Issuer Public Key rotation and consistency -- where consistency is as described
	in <xref target="CONSISTENCY"/>, and Issuer selection.</t>		in <xref target="I-D.ietf-privacypass-key-consistency"/> -- and Issuer selection
			.</t>
	</section>		</section>
	<section anchor="iana-considerations">		<section anchor="iana-considerations">
	<name>IANA considerations</name>		<name>IANA Considerations</name>
	<t>This section contains considerations for IANA.</t>
	<section anchor="wkuri-reg">		<section anchor="wkuri-reg">
	<name>Well-Known 'private-token-issuer-directory' URI</name>		<name>Well-Known &quot;private-token-issuer-directory&quot; URI</name>
	<t>This document updates the "Well-Known URIs" Registry <xref target="We		<t>IANA has updated the "Well-Known URIs" registry <xref target="WellKno
	llKnownURIs"/> with the		wnURIs"/> with the following values.</t>
	following values.</t>
	<table anchor="wellknownuri-values">		<table anchor="wellknownuri-values">
	<name>'private-token-issuer-directory' Well-Known URI</name>		<name>&quot;private-token-issuer-directory&quot; Well-Known URI</name>
	<thead>		<thead>
	<tr>		<tr>
	<th align="left">URI Suffix</th>		<th align="left">URI Suffix</th>
	<th align="left">Change Controller</th>		<th align="left">Change Controller</th>
	<th align="left">Reference</th>		<th align="left">Reference</th>
	<th align="left">Status</th>		<th align="left">Status</th>
	<th align="left">Related information</th>		<th align="left">Related Information</th>
	</tr>		</tr>
	</thead>		</thead>
	<tbody>		<tbody>
	<tr>		<tr>
	<td align="left">private-token-issuer-directory</td>		<td align="left">private-token-issuer-directory</td>
	<td align="left">IETF</td>		<td align="left">IETF</td>
	<td align="left">[this document]</td>		<td align="left">RFC 9578</td>
	<td align="left">permanent</td>		<td align="left">permanent</td>
	<td align="left">None</td>		<td align="left">None</td>
	</tr>		</tr>
	</tbody>		</tbody>
	</table>		</table>
	</section>		</section>
	<section anchor="token-type">		<section anchor="token-type">
	<name>Token Type Registry Updates</name>		<name>Privacy Pass Token Types</name>
	<t>This document updates the "Privacy Pass Token Type" Registry with the		<t>IANA has updated the "Privacy Pass Token Types" registry <xref target
	following entries.</t>		="PrivPassTokenTypes"/> with the entries below.</t>
	<section anchor="private-token-type">		<section anchor="private-token-type">
	<name>Token Type VOPRF (P-384, SHA-384)</name>		<name>Token Type VOPRF(P-384, SHA-384)</name>
	<ul spacing="normal">		<dl spacing="compact">
	<li>Value: 0x0001</li>		<dt>Value:</dt><dd>0x0001</dd>
	<li>Name: VOPRF (P-384, SHA-384)</li>		<dt>Name:</dt><dd>VOPRF(P-384, SHA-384)</dd>
	<li>Token Structure: As defined in <xref section="2.2" sectionFormat		<dt>Token Structure:</dt><dd>As defined in <xref target="RFC9577" se
	="of" target="AUTHSCHEME"/></li>		ctionFormat="of" section="2.2"/>.</dd>
	<li>Token Key Encoding: Serialized using SerializeElement from <xref		<dt>Token Key Encoding:</dt><dd>Serialized using SerializeElement (<
	section="2.1" sectionFormat="of" target="OPRF"/></li>		xref target="RFC9497" sectionFormat="of" section="2.1"/>).</dd>
	<li>TokenChallenge Structure: As defined in <xref section="2.1" sect		<dt>TokenChallenge Structure:</dt><dd>As defined in <xref target="RF
	ionFormat="of" target="AUTHSCHEME"/></li>		C9577" sectionFormat="of" section="2.1"/>.</dd>
	<li>Public Verifiability: N</li>		<dt>Publicly Verifiable:</dt><dd>N</dd>
	<li>Public Metadata: N</li>		<dt>Public Metadata:</dt><dd>N</dd>
	<li>Private Metadata: N</li>		<dt>Private Metadata:</dt><dd>N</dd>
	<li>Nk: 48</li>		<dt>Nk:</dt><dd>48</dd>
	<li>Nid: 32</li>		<dt>Nid:</dt><dd>32</dd>
	<li>Reference: <xref target="private-flow"/></li>		<dt>Change controller:</dt><dd>IETF</dd>
	<li>Notes: None</li>		<dt>Reference:</dt><dd>RFC 9578, <xref target="private-flow"/></dd>
	</ul>		<dt>Notes:</dt><dd>None</dd>
			</dl>
	</section>		</section>
	<section anchor="public-token-type">		<section anchor="public-token-type">
	<name>Token Type Blind RSA (2048-bit)</name>		<name>Token Type Blind RSA (2048-bit)</name>
	<ul spacing="normal">		<dl spacing="compact">
	<li>Value: 0x0002</li>		<dt>Value:</dt><dd>0x0002</dd>
	<li>Name: Blind RSA (2048-bit)</li>		<dt>Name:</dt><dd>Blind RSA (2048-bit)</dd>
	<li>Token Structure: As defined in <xref section="2.2" sectionFormat		<dt>Token Structure:</dt><dd>As defined in <xref target="RFC9577" se
	="of" target="AUTHSCHEME"/></li>		ctionFormat="of" section="2.2"/>.</dd>
	<li>Token Key Encoding: Serialized as a DER-encoded SubjectPublicKey		<dt>Token Key Encoding:</dt><dd>Serialized as a DER-encoded SubjectP
	Info (SPKI) object using the RSASSA-PSS OID <xref target="RFC5756"/></li>		ublicKeyInfo (SPKI) object using the RSASSA-PSS OID <xref target="RFC5756"/>.</d
	<li>TokenChallenge Structure: As defined in <xref section="2.1" sect		d>
	ionFormat="of" target="AUTHSCHEME"/></li>		<dt>TokenChallenge Structure:</dt><dd>As defined in <xref target="RF
	<li>Public Verifiability: Y</li>		C9577" sectionFormat="of" section="2.1"/>.</dd>
	<li>Public Metadata: N</li>		<dt>Publicly Verifiable:</dt><dd>Y</dd>
	<li>Private Metadata: N</li>		<dt>Public Metadata:</dt><dd>N</dd>
	<li>Nk: 256</li>		<dt>Private Metadata:</dt><dd>N</dd>
	<li>Nid: 32</li>		<dt>Nk:</dt><dd>256</dd>
	<li>Reference: <xref target="public-flow"/></li>		<dt>Nid:</dt><dd>32</dd>
	<li>Notes: The RSABSSA-SHA384-PSS-Deterministic and		<dt>Change controller:</dt><dd>IETF</dd>
	RSABSSA-SHA384-PSSZERO-Deterministic variants are supported</li>		<dt>Reference:</dt><dd>RFC 9578, <xref target="public-flow"/></dd>
	</ul>		<dt>Notes:</dt><dd>The RSABSSA-SHA384-PSS-Deterministic and
			RSABSSA-SHA384-PSSZERO-Deterministic variants are supported.</dd>
			</dl>
	</section>		</section>
	</section>		</section>
	<section anchor="media-types">		<section anchor="media-types">
	<name>Media Types</name>		<name>Media Types</name>
	<t>The following entries should be added to the IANA "media types"		<t>IANA has added the following entries to the "Media Types"
	registry:</t>		registry <xref target="MediaTypes"/>:</t>
	<ul spacing="normal">		<ul spacing="normal">
	<li>"application/private-token-issuer-directory"</li>		<li>"application/private-token-issuer-directory"</li>
	<li>"application/private-token-request"</li>		<li>"application/private-token-request"</li>
	<li>"application/private-token-response"</li>		<li>"application/private-token-response"</li>
	</ul>		</ul>
	<t>The templates for these entries are listed below and the		<t>The templates for these entries are listed below. The reference
	reference should be this RFC.</t>		is this RFC.</t>
	<section anchor="applicationprivate-token-issuer-directory-media-type">		<section anchor="applicationprivate-token-issuer-directory-media-type">
	<name>"application/private-token-issuer-directory" media type</name>		<name>"application/private-token-issuer-directory" Media Type</name>
	<dl spacing="compact">		<dl spacing="normal">
	<dt>Type name:</dt>		<dt>Type name:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>application</t>		<t>application</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Subtype name:</dt>		<dt>Subtype name:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>private-token-issuer-directory</t>		<t>private-token-issuer-directory</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Required parameters:</dt>		<dt>Required parameters:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>N/A</t>		<t>N/A</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Optional parameters:</dt>		<dt>Optional parameters:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>N/A</t>		<t>N/A</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Encoding considerations:</dt>		<dt>Encoding considerations:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>"binary"</t>		<t>binary</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Security considerations:</dt>		<dt>Security considerations:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>see <xref target="setup"/></t>		<t>See <xref target="security"/> of RFC 9578.</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Interoperability considerations:</dt>		<dt>Interoperability considerations:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>N/A</t>		<t>N/A</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Published specification:</dt>		<dt>Published specification:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>this specification</t>		<t>RFC 9578</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Applications that use this media type:</dt>		<dt>Applications that use this media type:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>Services that implement the Privacy Pass issuer role, and clien		<t>Services that implement the Privacy Pass Issuer role, and Clien
	t		t
	applications that interact with the issuer for the purposes of		applications that interact with the Issuer for the purposes of
	issuing or redeeming tokens.</t>		issuing or redeeming tokens.</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Fragment identifier considerations:</dt>		<dt>Fragment identifier considerations:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>N/A</t>		<t>N/A</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Additional information:</dt>		<dt>Additional information:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd><t><br/></t>
	<dl spacing="compact">		<dl spacing="compact">
	<dt>Magic number(s):</dt>
	<dd>N/A</dd>
	<dt>Deprecated alias names for this type:</dt>		<dt>Deprecated alias names for this type:</dt>
	<dd>N/A</dd>		<dd><t>N/A</t></dd>
			<dt>Magic number(s):</dt>
			<dd><t>N/A</t></dd>
	<dt>File extension(s):</dt>		<dt>File extension(s):</dt>
	<dd>N/A</dd>		<dd><t>N/A</t></dd>
	<dt>Macintosh file type code(s):</dt>		<dt>Macintosh file type code(s):</dt>
	<dd>N/A</dd>		<dd><t>N/A</t></dd>
	</dl>		</dl>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Person and email address to contact for further information:</dt >		<dt>Person &amp; email address to contact for further information:</ dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>see Authors' Addresses section</t>		<t>See the Authors' Addresses section of RFC 9578.</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Intended usage:</dt>		<dt>Intended usage:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>COMMON</t>		<t>COMMON</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Restrictions on usage:</dt>		<dt>Restrictions on usage:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>N/A</t>		<t>N/A</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Author:</dt>		<dt>Author:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>see Authors' Addresses section</t>		<t>See the Authors' Addresses section of RFC 9578.</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Change controller:</dt>		<dt>Change controller:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>IETF</t>		<t>IETF</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	</dl>		</dl>
	</section>		</section>
	<section anchor="applicationprivate-token-request-media-type">		<section anchor="applicationprivate-token-request-media-type">
	<name>"application/private-token-request" media type</name>		<name>"application/private-token-request" Media Type</name>
	<dl spacing="compact">		<dl spacing="normal">
	<dt>Type name:</dt>		<dt>Type name:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>application</t>		<t>application</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Subtype name:</dt>		<dt>Subtype name:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>private-token-request</t>		<t>private-token-request</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Required parameters:</dt>		<dt>Required parameters:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>N/A</t>		<t>N/A</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Optional parameters:</dt>		<dt>Optional parameters:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>N/A</t>		<t>N/A</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Encoding considerations:</dt>		<dt>Encoding considerations:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>"binary"</t>		<t>binary</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Security considerations:</dt>		<dt>Security considerations:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>see <xref target="security"/></t>		<t>See <xref target="security"/> of RFC 9578.</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Interoperability considerations:</dt>		<dt>Interoperability considerations:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>N/A</t>		<t>N/A</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Published specification:</dt>		<dt>Published specification:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>this specification</t>		<t>RFC 9578</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Applications that use this media type:</dt>		<dt>Applications that use this media type:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>Applications that want to issue or facilitate issuance of Priva cy Pass tokens,		<t>Applications that want to issue or facilitate issuance of Priva cy Pass tokens,
	including Privacy Pass issuer applications themselves.</t>		including Privacy Pass Issuer applications themselves.</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Fragment identifier considerations:</dt>		<dt>Fragment identifier considerations:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>N/A</t>		<t>N/A</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Additional information:</dt>		<dt>Additional information:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd><t><br/></t>
	<dl spacing="compact">		<dl spacing="compact">
	<dt>Magic number(s):</dt>
	<dd>N/A</dd>
	<dt>Deprecated alias names for this type:</dt>		<dt>Deprecated alias names for this type:</dt>
	<dd>N/A</dd>		<dd><t>N/A</t></dd>
			<dt>Magic number(s):</dt>
			<dd><t>N/A</t></dd>
	<dt>File extension(s):</dt>		<dt>File extension(s):</dt>
	<dd>N/A</dd>		<dd><t>N/A</t></dd>
	<dt>Macintosh file type code(s):</dt>		<dt>Macintosh file type code(s):</dt>
	<dd>N/A</dd>		<dd><t>N/A</t></dd>
	</dl>		</dl>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Person and email address to contact for further information:</dt >		<dt>Person &amp; email address to contact for further information:</ dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>see Authors' Addresses section</t>		<t>See the Authors' Addresses section of RFC 9578.</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Intended usage:</dt>		<dt>Intended usage:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>COMMON</t>		<t>COMMON</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Restrictions on usage:</dt>		<dt>Restrictions on usage:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>N/A</t>		<t>N/A</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Author:</dt>		<dt>Author:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>see Authors' Addresses section</t>		<t>See the Authors' Addresses section of RFC 9578.</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Change controller:</dt>		<dt>Change controller:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>IETF</t>		<t>IETF</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	</dl>		</dl>
	</section>		</section>
	<section anchor="applicationprivate-token-response-media-type">		<section anchor="applicationprivate-token-response-media-type">
	<name>"application/private-token-response" media type</name>		<name>"application/private-token-response" Media Type</name>
	<dl spacing="compact">		<dl spacing="normal">
	<dt>Type name:</dt>		<dt>Type name:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>application</t>		<t>application</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Subtype name:</dt>		<dt>Subtype name:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>private-token-response</t>		<t>private-token-response</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Required parameters:</dt>		<dt>Required parameters:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>N/A</t>		<t>N/A</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Optional parameters:</dt>		<dt>Optional parameters:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>N/A</t>		<t>N/A</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Encoding considerations:</dt>		<dt>Encoding considerations:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>"binary"</t>		<t>binary</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Security considerations:</dt>		<dt>Security considerations:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>see <xref target="security"/></t>		<t>See <xref target="security"/> of RFC 9578.</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Interoperability considerations:</dt>		<dt>Interoperability considerations:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>N/A</t>		<t>N/A</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Published specification:</dt>		<dt>Published specification:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>this specification</t>		<t>RFC 9578</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Applications that use this media type:</dt>		<dt>Applications that use this media type:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>Applications that want to issue or facilitate issuance of Priva cy Pass tokens,		<t>Applications that want to issue or facilitate issuance of Priva cy Pass tokens,
	including Privacy Pass issuer applications themselves.</t>		including Privacy Pass Issuer applications themselves.</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Fragment identifier considerations:</dt>		<dt>Fragment identifier considerations:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>N/A</t>		<t>N/A</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Additional information:</dt>		<dt>Additional information:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd><t><br/></t>
	<dl spacing="compact">		<dl spacing="compact">
	<dt>Magic number(s):</dt>
	<dd>N/A</dd>
	<dt>Deprecated alias names for this type:</dt>		<dt>Deprecated alias names for this type:</dt>
	<dd>N/A</dd>		<dd><t>N/A</t></dd>
			<dt>Magic number(s):</dt>
			<dd><t>N/A</t></dd>
	<dt>File extension(s):</dt>		<dt>File extension(s):</dt>
	<dd>N/A</dd>		<dd><t>N/A</t></dd>
	<dt>Macintosh file type code(s):</dt>		<dt>Macintosh file type code(s):</dt>
	<dd>N/A</dd>		<dd><t>N/A</t></dd>
	</dl>		</dl>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Person and email address to contact for further information:</dt >		<dt>Person &amp; email address to contact for further information:</ dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>see Authors' Addresses section</t>		<t>See the Authors' Addresses section of RFC 9578.</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Intended usage:</dt>		<dt>Intended usage:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>COMMON</t>		<t>COMMON</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Restrictions on usage:</dt>		<dt>Restrictions on usage:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>N/A</t>		<t>N/A</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Author:</dt>		<dt>Author:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>see Authors' Addresses section</t>		<t>See the Authors' Addresses section of RFC 9578.</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	<dt>Change controller:</dt>		<dt>Change controller:</dt>
	<dd>		<dd>
	<t>IETF</t>		<t>IETF</t>
	</dd>		</dd>
	</dl>		</dl>
	</section>		</section>
	</section>		</section>
	</section>		</section>
	</middle>		</middle>
	<back>		<back>
			<displayreference target="RFC9576" to="ARCHITECTURE"/>
			<displayreference target="RFC9110" to="HTTP"/>
			<displayreference target="RFC9497" to="OPRF"/>
			<displayreference target="RFC9474" to="BLINDRSA"/>
			<displayreference target="RFC8446" to="TLS13"/>
			<displayreference target="RFC8877" to="TIMESTAMP"/>
			<displayreference target="RFC9577" to="AUTHSCHEME"/>
			<displayreference target="I-D.ietf-privacypass-key-consistency" to="CONSISTENCY"
			/>
	<references>		<references>
	<name>References</name>		<name>References</name>
	<references>		<references>
	<name>Normative References</name>		<name>Normative References</name>
	<reference anchor="RFC2119">
	<front>		<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml"
	<title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</tit		/>
	le>
	<author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>		<reference anchor="WellKnownURIs" target="https://www.iana.org/assignmen
	<date month="March" year="1997"/>		ts/well-known-uris/">
	<abstract>
	<t>In many standards track documents several words are used to sig
	nify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. T
	his document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents
	. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Co
	mmunity, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="WellKnownURIs" target="https://www.iana.org/assignmen
	ts/well-known-uris/well-known-uris.xhtml">
	<front>		<front>
	<title>Well-Known URIs</title>		<title>Well-Known URIs</title>
	<author>		<author>
	<organization/>		<organization>IANA</organization>
	</author>		</author>
	<date>n.d.</date>		<date></date>
	</front>		</front>
	</reference>		</reference>
	<reference anchor="ARCHITECTURE">
	<front>
	<title>The Privacy Pass Architecture</title>
	<author fullname="Alex Davidson" initials="A." surname="Davidson">
	<organization>LIP</organization>
	</author>
	<author fullname="Jana Iyengar" initials="J." surname="Iyengar">
	<organization>Fastly</organization>
	</author>
	<author fullname="Christopher A. Wood" initials="C. A." surname="Woo
	d">
	<organization>Cloudflare</organization>
	</author>
	<date day="25" month="September" year="2023"/>
	<abstract>
	<t> This document specifies the Privacy Pass architecture and
	requirements for its constituent protocols used for authorization
	based on privacy-preserving authentication mechanisms. It describes
	the conceptual model of Privacy Pass and its protocols, its security
	and privacy goals, practical deployment models, and recommendations
	for each deployment model that helps ensure the desired security and
	privacy goals are fulfilled.
	</t>		<reference anchor="PrivPassTokenTypes" target="https://www.iana.org/assi
	</abstract>		gnments/privacy-pass/">
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-privacypass-archit
	ecture-16"/>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="HTTP">
	<front>		<front>
	<title>HTTP Semantics</title>		<title>Privacy Pass Token Types</title>
	<author fullname="R. Fielding" initials="R." role="editor" surname="		<author>
	Fielding"/>		<organization>IANA</organization>
	<author fullname="M. Nottingham" initials="M." role="editor" surname		</author>
	="Nottingham"/>		<date></date>
	<author fullname="J. Reschke" initials="J." role="editor" surname="R
	eschke"/>
	<date month="June" year="2022"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a stateless applicati
	on-level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypertext information systems.
	This document describes the overall architecture of HTTP, establishes common te
	rminology, and defines aspects of the protocol that are shared by all versions.
	In this definition are core protocol elements, extensibility mechanisms, and the
	"http" and "https" Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes.</t>
	<t>This document updates RFC 3864 and obsoletes RFCs 2818, 7231, 7
	232, 7233, 7235, 7538, 7615, 7694, and portions of 7230.</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>		</front>
	<seriesInfo name="STD" value="97"/>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9110"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9110"/>
	</reference>		</reference>
	<reference anchor="OPRF">
			<reference anchor="MediaTypes" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/
			media-types/">
	<front>		<front>
	<title>Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions (OPRFs) using Prime-Order Gr		<title>Media Types</title>
	oups</title>		<author>
	<author fullname="Alex Davidson" initials="A." surname="Davidson">		<organization>IANA</organization>
	<organization>Brave Software</organization>
	</author>
	<author fullname="Armando Faz-Hernandez" initials="A." surname="Faz-
	Hernandez">
	<organization>Cloudflare, Inc.</organization>
	</author>
	<author fullname="Nick Sullivan" initials="N." surname="Sullivan">
	<organization>Cloudflare, Inc.</organization>
	</author>
	<author fullname="Christopher A. Wood" initials="C. A." surname="Woo
	d">
	<organization>Cloudflare, Inc.</organization>
	</author>		</author>
	<date day="21" month="February" year="2023"/>		<date></date>
	<abstract>
	<t> An Oblivious Pseudorandom Function (OPRF) is a two-party pro
	tocol
	between client and server for computing the output of a Pseudorandom
	Function (PRF). The server provides the PRF private key, and the
	client provides the PRF input. At the end of the protocol, the
	client learns the PRF output without learning anything about the PRF
	private key, and the server learns neither the PRF input nor output.
	An OPRF can also satisfy a notion of 'verifiability', called a VOPRF.
	A VOPRF ensures clients can verify that the server used a specific
	private key during the execution of the protocol. A VOPRF can also
	be partially-oblivious, called a POPRF. A POPRF allows clients and
	servers to provide public input to the PRF computation. This
	document specifies an OPRF, VOPRF, and POPRF instantiated within
	standard prime-order groups, including elliptic curves. This
	document is a product of the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG) in
	the IRTF.
	</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>		</front>
	<seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-irtf-cfrg-voprf-21"/>
	</reference>		</reference>
	<reference anchor="BLINDRSA">
	<front>
	<title>RSA Blind Signatures</title>
	<author fullname="Frank Denis" initials="F." surname="Denis">
	<organization>Fastly Inc.</organization>
	</author>
	<author fullname="Frederic Jacobs" initials="F." surname="Jacobs">
	<organization>Apple Inc.</organization>
	</author>
	<author fullname="Christopher A. Wood" initials="C. A." surname="Woo
	d">
	<organization>Cloudflare</organization>
	</author>
	<date day="10" month="July" year="2023"/>
	<abstract>
	<t> This document specifies an RSA-based blind signature protoco
	l. RSA
	blind signatures were first introduced by Chaum for untraceable
	payments. A signature that is output from this protocol can be
	verified as an RSA-PSS signature.
	This document is a product of the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG)		<!-- draft-ietf-privacypass-architecture (RFC 9576) -->
	in the IRTF.		<reference anchor="RFC9576" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9576">
			<front>
			<title>The Privacy Pass Architecture</title>
			<author initials='A' surname='Davidson' fullname='Alex Davidson'>
			<organization />
			</author>
			<author initials='J' surname='Iyengar' fullname='Jana Iyengar'>
			<organization />
			</author>
			<author initials='C. A.' surname='Wood' fullname='Christopher A. Wood'>
			<organization />
			</author>
			<date year='2024' month='May'/>
			</front>
			<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9576"/>
			<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9576"/>
			</reference>
	Discussion Venues		<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9110.xml" />
	This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.		<!-- draft-irtf-cfrg-voprf (RFC 9497; published) -->
			<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9497.xml"
			/>
	Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at		<!-- draft-irtf-cfrg-rsa-blind-signatures (RFC 9474; published) -->
	https://github.com/chris-wood/draft-wood-cfrg-blind-signatures.		<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9474.xml"
			/>
	</t>		<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml"
	</abstract>		/>
	</front>		<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8446.xml"
	<seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-irtf-cfrg-rsa-blind-sig		/>
	natures-14"/>		<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8259.xml"
	</reference>		/>
	<reference anchor="RFC8174">		<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4648.xml"
	<front>		/>
	<title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</ti		<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8877.xml"
	tle>		/>
	<author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
	<date month="May" year="2017"/>		<!-- draft-ietf-privacypass-auth-scheme (RFC 9577) -->
	<abstract>		<reference anchor="RFC9577" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9577">
	<t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protoco		<front>
	l specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that		<title>The Privacy Pass HTTP Authentication Scheme</title>
	only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>		<author initials="T." surname="Pauly" fullname="Tommy Pauly">
	</abstract>		<organization>Apple Inc.</organization>
	</front>		</author>
	<seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>		<author initials="S." surname="Valdez" fullname="Steven Valdez">
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>		<organization>Google LLC</organization>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>		</author>
	</reference>		<author initials="C. A." surname="Wood" fullname="Christopher A. Wood">
	<reference anchor="TLS13">		<organization>Cloudflare</organization>
	<front>		</author>
	<title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3</titl		<date month="May" year="2024"/>
	e>		</front>
	<author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/>		<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9577"/>
	<date month="August" year="2018"/>		<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9577"/>
	<abstract>		</reference>
	<t>This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Secu
	rity (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over t		<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5861.xml"
	he Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and m		/>
	essage forgery.</t>		<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9111.xml"
	<t>This document updates RFCs 5705 and 6066, and obsoletes RFCs 50		/>
	77, 5246, and 6961. This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 im		<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8017.xml"
	plementations.</t>		/>
	</abstract>		<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5756.xml"
	</front>		/>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8446"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8446"/>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="RFC8259">
	<front>
	<title>The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format
	</title>
	<author fullname="T. Bray" initials="T." role="editor" surname="Bray
	"/>
	<date month="December" year="2017"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) is a lightweight, text-based,
	language-independent data interchange format. It was derived from the ECMAScrip
	t Programming Language Standard. JSON defines a small set of formatting rules fo
	r the portable representation of structured data.</t>
	<t>This document removes inconsistencies with other specifications
	of JSON, repairs specification errors, and offers experience-based interoperabi
	lity guidance.</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="STD" value="90"/>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8259"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8259"/>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="RFC4648">
	<front>
	<title>The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings</title>
	<author fullname="S. Josefsson" initials="S." surname="Josefsson"/>
	<date month="October" year="2006"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>This document describes the commonly used base 64, base 32, and
	base 16 encoding schemes. It also discusses the use of line-feeds in encoded da
	ta, use of padding in encoded data, use of non-alphabet characters in encoded da
	ta, use of different encoding alphabets, and canonical encodings. [STANDARDS-TRA
	CK]</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4648"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4648"/>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="TIMESTAMP">
	<front>
	<title>Guidelines for Defining Packet Timestamps</title>
	<author fullname="T. Mizrahi" initials="T." surname="Mizrahi"/>
	<author fullname="J. Fabini" initials="J." surname="Fabini"/>
	<author fullname="A. Morton" initials="A." surname="Morton"/>
	<date month="September" year="2020"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>Various network protocols make use of binary-encoded timestamps
	that are incorporated in the protocol packet format, referred to as "packet tim
	estamps" for short. This document specifies guidelines for defining packet times
	tamp formats in networking protocols at various layers. It also presents three r
	ecommended timestamp formats. The target audience of this document includes netw
	ork protocol designers. It is expected that a new network protocol that requires
	a packet timestamp will, in most cases, use one of the recommended timestamp fo
	rmats. If none of the recommended formats fits the protocol requirements, the ne
	w protocol specification should specify the format of the packet timestamp accor
	ding to the guidelines in this document.</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8877"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8877"/>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="AUTHSCHEME">
	<front>
	<title>The Privacy Pass HTTP Authentication Scheme</title>
	<author fullname="Tommy Pauly" initials="T." surname="Pauly">
	<organization>Apple Inc.</organization>
	</author>
	<author fullname="Steven Valdez" initials="S." surname="Valdez">
	<organization>Google LLC</organization>
	</author>
	<author fullname="Christopher A. Wood" initials="C. A." surname="Woo
	d">
	<organization>Cloudflare</organization>
	</author>
	<date day="25" month="September" year="2023"/>
	<abstract>
	<t> This document defines an HTTP authentication scheme for Priv
	acy Pass,
	a privacy-preserving authentication mechanism used for authorization.
	The authentication scheme in this document can be used by clients to
	redeem Privacy Pass tokens with an origin. It can also be used by
	origins to challenge clients to present Privacy Pass tokens.
	</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-privacypass-auth-s
	cheme-14"/>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="RFC5861">
	<front>
	<title>HTTP Cache-Control Extensions for Stale Content</title>
	<author fullname="M. Nottingham" initials="M." surname="Nottingham"/
	>
	<date month="May" year="2010"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>This document defines two independent HTTP Cache-Control extens
	ions that allow control over the use of stale responses by caches. This document
	is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informati
	onal purposes.</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5861"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5861"/>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="RFC9111">
	<front>
	<title>HTTP Caching</title>
	<author fullname="R. Fielding" initials="R." role="editor" surname="
	Fielding"/>
	<author fullname="M. Nottingham" initials="M." role="editor" surname
	="Nottingham"/>
	<author fullname="J. Reschke" initials="J." role="editor" surname="R
	eschke"/>
	<date month="June" year="2022"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a stateless applicati
	on-level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypertext information systems.
	This document defines HTTP caches and the associated header fields that control
	cache behavior or indicate cacheable response messages.</t>
	<t>This document obsoletes RFC 7234.</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="STD" value="98"/>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9111"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9111"/>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="RFC8017">
	<front>
	<title>PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2</title>
	<author fullname="K. Moriarty" initials="K." role="editor" surname="
	Moriarty"/>
	<author fullname="B. Kaliski" initials="B." surname="Kaliski"/>
	<author fullname="J. Jonsson" initials="J." surname="Jonsson"/>
	<author fullname="A. Rusch" initials="A." surname="Rusch"/>
	<date month="November" year="2016"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>This document provides recommendations for the implementation o
	f public-key cryptography based on the RSA algorithm, covering cryptographic pri
	mitives, encryption schemes, signature schemes with appendix, and ASN.1 syntax f
	or representing keys and for identifying the schemes.</t>
	<t>This document represents a republication of PKCS #1 v2.2 from R
	SA Laboratories' Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) series. By publishing
	this RFC, change control is transferred to the IETF.</t>
	<t>This document also obsoletes RFC 3447.</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8017"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8017"/>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="RFC5756">
	<front>
	<title>Updates for RSAES-OAEP and RSASSA-PSS Algorithm Parameters</t
	itle>
	<author fullname="S. Turner" initials="S." surname="Turner"/>
	<author fullname="D. Brown" initials="D." surname="Brown"/>
	<author fullname="K. Yiu" initials="K." surname="Yiu"/>
	<author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley"/>
	<author fullname="T. Polk" initials="T." surname="Polk"/>
	<date month="January" year="2010"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>This document updates RFC 4055. It updates the conventions for
	using the RSA Encryption Scheme - Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (RSAES-O
	AEP) key transport algorithm in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PK
	I). Specifically, it updates the conventions for algorithm parameters in an X.50
	9 certificate's subjectPublicKeyInfo field. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5756"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5756"/>
	</reference>
	</references>		</references>
	<references>		<references>
	<name>Informative References</name>		<name>Informative References</name>
	<reference anchor="DSS" target="https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.fips.186-5" >		<reference anchor="DSS" target="https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.fips.186-5" >
	<front>		<front>
	<title>Digital Signature Standard (DSS)</title>		<title>Digital Signature Standard (DSS)</title>
	<author fullname="Dustin Moody" surname="Moody">
	<organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology</orga
	nization>
	</author>
	<author>		<author>
	<organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology</orga nization>		<organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology</orga nization>
	</author>		</author>
	<date year="2023"/>		<date month="February" year="2023"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>&lt;jats:p /&gt;</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/nist.fips.186-5"/>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="RFC5280">
	<front>
	<title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Cert
	ificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile</title>
	<author fullname="D. Cooper" initials="D." surname="Cooper"/>
	<author fullname="S. Santesson" initials="S." surname="Santesson"/>
	<author fullname="S. Farrell" initials="S." surname="Farrell"/>
	<author fullname="S. Boeyen" initials="S." surname="Boeyen"/>
	<author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley"/>
	<author fullname="W. Polk" initials="W." surname="Polk"/>
	<date month="May" year="2008"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certif
	icate revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. An overview of this approac
	h and model is provided as an introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is d
	escribed in detail, with additional information regarding the format and semanti
	cs of Internet name forms. Standard certificate extensions are described and two
	Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set of required certificate extensi
	ons is specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described in detail along with stan
	dard and Internet-specific extensions. An algorithm for X.509 certification path
	validation is described. An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in the appen
	dices. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>		</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5280"/>		<seriesInfo name="NIST FIPS Publication" value="186-5"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5280"/>		<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-5"/>
	</reference>		</reference>
	<reference anchor="CONSISTENCY">
	<front>
	<title>Key Consistency and Discovery</title>
	<author fullname="Alex Davidson" initials="A." surname="Davidson">
	<organization>Brave Software</organization>
	</author>
	<author fullname="Matthew Finkel" initials="M." surname="Finkel">
	<organization>The Tor Project</organization>
	</author>
	<author fullname="Martin Thomson" initials="M." surname="Thomson">
	<organization>Mozilla</organization>
	</author>
	<author fullname="Christopher A. Wood" initials="C. A." surname="Woo
	d">
	<organization>Cloudflare</organization>
	</author>
	<date day="10" month="July" year="2023"/>
	<abstract>
	<t> This document describes the consistency requirements of prot
	ocols
	such as Privacy Pass, Oblivious DoH, and Oblivious HTTP for user
	privacy. It presents definitions for consistency and then surveys
	mechanisms for providing consistency in varying threat models. In
	concludes with discussion of open problems in this area.
	</t>		<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5280.xml"
	</abstract>		/>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-privacypass-key-co		<!-- draft-ietf-privacypass-key-consistency (Expired) -->
	nsistency-01"/>		<xi:include href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-pr
	</reference>		ivacypass-key-consistency.xml"/>
	</references>		</references>
	</references>		</references>
	<section anchor="acknowledgements">
	<name>Acknowledgements</name>
	<t>The authors of this document would like to acknowledge the helpful
	feedback and discussions from Benjamin Schwartz, Joseph Salowey,
	and Tara Whalen.</t>
	</section>
	<section anchor="test-vectors">		<section anchor="test-vectors">
	<name>Test Vectors</name>		<name>Test Vectors</name>
	<t>This section includes test vectors for the two basic issuance protocols		<t>This section includes test vectors for the two basic issuance protocols
	specified in this document. <xref target="test-vectors-poprf"/> contains test ve ctors		specified in this document. <xref target="test-vectors-poprf"/> contains test ve ctors
	for token issuance protocol 1 (0x0001), and <xref target="test-vectors-rsa"/> co ntains		for token issuance protocol 1 (0x0001), and <xref target="test-vectors-rsa"/> co ntains
	test vectors for token issuance protocol 2 (0x0002).</t>		test vectors for token issuance protocol 2 (0x0002).</t>
	<section anchor="test-vectors-poprf">		<section anchor="test-vectors-poprf">
	<name>Issuance Protocol 1 - VOPRF(P-384, SHA-384)</name>		<name>Issuance Protocol 1 - VOPRF(P-384, SHA-384)</name>
	<t>The test vector below lists the following values:</t>		<t>The test vectors below list the following values:</t>
	<ul spacing="normal">		<dl spacing="normal">
	<li>skS: The Issuer Private Key, serialized using SerializeScalar from		<dt>skI:</dt><dd>The Issuer Private Key, serialized using SerializeSca
	<xref section="2.1" sectionFormat="of" target="OPRF"/> and represented as a hexa		lar
	decimal string.</li>		(<xref section="2.1" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC9497"/>) and represented a
	<li>pkS: The Issuer Public Key, serialized according to the encoding i		s a hexadecimal string.</dd>
	n <xref target="private-token-type"/>.</li>		<dt>pkI:</dt><dd>The Issuer Public Key, serialized according to the en
	<li>token_challenge: A randomly generated TokenChallenge structure, re		coding in <xref target="private-token-type"/>.</dd>
	presented		<dt>token_challenge:</dt><dd>A randomly generated TokenChallenge struc
	as a hexadecimal string.</li>		ture, represented
	<li>nonce: The 32-byte client nonce generated according to <xref targe		as a hexadecimal string.</dd>
	t="private-request"/>,		<dt>nonce:</dt><dd>The 32-byte Client nonce generated according to <xr
	represented as a hexadecimal string.</li>		ef target="private-request"/>,
	<li>blind: The blind used when computing the OPRF blinded message, ser		represented as a hexadecimal string.</dd>
	ialized		<dt>blind:</dt><dd>The blind used when computing the OPRF blinded mess
	using SerializeScalar from <xref section="2.1" sectionFormat="of" target="OPRF"/		age, serialized
	> and represented as a		using SerializeScalar (<xref section="2.1" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC9497
	hexadecimal string.</li>		"/>) and represented as a
	<li>token_request: The TokenRequest message constructed according to		hexadecimal string.</dd>
	<xref target="private-request"/>, represented as a hexadecimal string.</li>		<dt>token_request:</dt><dd>The TokenRequest message constructed accord
	<li>token_response: The TokenResponse message constructed according to		ing to
	<xref target="private-response"/>, represented as a hexadecimal string.</li>		<xref target="private-request"/>, represented as a hexadecimal string.</dd>
	<li>token: The output Token from the protocol, represented as a hexade		<dt>token_response:</dt><dd>The TokenResponse message constructed acco
	cimal		rding to
	string.</li>		<xref target="private-response"/>, represented as a hexadecimal string.</dd>
	</ul>		<dt>token:</dt><dd>The output token from the protocol, represented as
	<artwork><![CDATA[		a hexadecimal
			string.</dd>
			</dl>
			<sourcecode name="" type="test-vectors"><![CDATA[
	// Test vector 1		// Test vector 1
	skS: 39b0d04d3732459288fc5edb89bb02c2aa42e06709f201d6c518871d5181		skI: 39b0d04d3732459288fc5edb89bb02c2aa42e06709f201d6c518871d5181
	14910bee3c919bed1bbffe3fc1b87d53240a		14910bee3c919bed1bbffe3fc1b87d53240a
	pkS: 02d45bf522425cdd2227d3f27d245d9d563008829252172d34e48469290c		pkI: 02d45bf522425cdd2227d3f27d245d9d563008829252172d34e48469290c
	21da1a46d42ca38f7beabdf05c074aee1455bf		21da1a46d42ca38f7beabdf05c074aee1455bf
	token_challenge: 0001000e6973737565722e6578616d706c65205de58a52fc		token_challenge: 0001000e6973737565722e6578616d706c65205de58a52fc
	daef25ca3f65448d04e040fb1924e8264acfccfc6c5ad451d582b3000e6f72696		daef25ca3f65448d04e040fb1924e8264acfccfc6c5ad451d582b3000e6f72696
	7696e2e6578616d706c65		7696e2e6578616d706c65
	nonce:		nonce:
	6aa422c41b59d3e44a136dd439df2454e3587ee5f3697798cdc05fafe73073b8		6aa422c41b59d3e44a136dd439df2454e3587ee5f3697798cdc05fafe73073b8
	blind: 8e7fd80970b8a00b0931b801a2e22d9903d83bd5597c6a4dc1496ed2b1		blind: 8e7fd80970b8a00b0931b801a2e22d9903d83bd5597c6a4dc1496ed2b1
	7ef820445ef3bd223f3ab2c4f54c5d1c956909		7ef820445ef3bd223f3ab2c4f54c5d1c956909
	token_request: 0001f4030ab3e23181d1e213f24315f5775983c678ce22eff9		token_request: 0001f4030ab3e23181d1e213f24315f5775983c678ce22eff9
	427610832ab3900f2cd12d6829a07ec8a6813cf0b5b886f4cc4979		427610832ab3900f2cd12d6829a07ec8a6813cf0b5b886f4cc4979
	skipping to change at line 1526 ¶		skipping to change at line 1306 ¶
	34ea9660212c0c85fbadfbf491a1ce2446fc3379337fccd45c1059b2bc760110e		34ea9660212c0c85fbadfbf491a1ce2446fc3379337fccd45c1059b2bc760110e
	e1ec227d8e01c9f482c00c47ffa0dbe2fb58c32dde2b1dbe69fff920a528e68dd		e1ec227d8e01c9f482c00c47ffa0dbe2fb58c32dde2b1dbe69fff920a528e68dd
	9b3c2483848e57c30542b8984fa6bfecd6d71d54d53eda		9b3c2483848e57c30542b8984fa6bfecd6d71d54d53eda
	token: 00016aa422c41b59d3e44a136dd439df2454e3587ee5f3697798cdc05f		token: 00016aa422c41b59d3e44a136dd439df2454e3587ee5f3697798cdc05f
	afe73073b8501370b494089dc462802af545e63809581ee6ef57890a12105c283		afe73073b8501370b494089dc462802af545e63809581ee6ef57890a12105c283
	68169514bf260d0792bf7f46c9866a6d37c3032d8714415f87f5f6903d7fb071e		68169514bf260d0792bf7f46c9866a6d37c3032d8714415f87f5f6903d7fb071e
	253be2f4e0a835d76528b8444f73789ee7dc90715b01c17902fd87375c00a7a9d		253be2f4e0a835d76528b8444f73789ee7dc90715b01c17902fd87375c00a7a9d
	3d92540437f470773be20f71e721da3af40edeb		3d92540437f470773be20f71e721da3af40edeb
	// Test vector 2		// Test vector 2
	skS: 39efed331527cc4ddff9722ab5cd35aeafe7c27520b0cfa2eedbdc298dc3		skI: 39efed331527cc4ddff9722ab5cd35aeafe7c27520b0cfa2eedbdc298dc3
	b12bc8298afcc46558af1e2eeacc5307d865		b12bc8298afcc46558af1e2eeacc5307d865
	pkS: 038017e005904c6146b37109d6c2a72b95a183aaa9ed951b8d8fb1ed9033		pkI: 038017e005904c6146b37109d6c2a72b95a183aaa9ed951b8d8fb1ed9033
	f68033284d175e7df89849475cd67a86bfbf4e		f68033284d175e7df89849475cd67a86bfbf4e
	token_challenge: 0001000e6973737565722e6578616d706c6500000e6f7269		token_challenge: 0001000e6973737565722e6578616d706c6500000e6f7269
	67696e2e6578616d706c65		67696e2e6578616d706c65
	nonce:		nonce:
	7617bc802cfdb5d74722ef7418bdbb4f2c88403820e55fe7ec07d3190c29d665		7617bc802cfdb5d74722ef7418bdbb4f2c88403820e55fe7ec07d3190c29d665
	blind: 6492ee50072fa18d035d69c4246362dffe2621afb95a10c033bb0109e0		blind: 6492ee50072fa18d035d69c4246362dffe2621afb95a10c033bb0109e0
	f705b0437c425553272e0aa5266ec379e7015e		f705b0437c425553272e0aa5266ec379e7015e
	token_request: 000133033a5fe04a39da1bbfb68ccdeecd1917474dd525462e		token_request: 000133033a5fe04a39da1bbfb68ccdeecd1917474dd525462e
	5a90a6ba53b42aaa1486fe443a2e1c7f3fd5ff028a1c7cf1aeac5d		5a90a6ba53b42aaa1486fe443a2e1c7f3fd5ff028a1c7cf1aeac5d
	token_response: 023bf8cd624880d669c5cc6c88b056355c6e8e1bcbf3746cf		token_response: 023bf8cd624880d669c5cc6c88b056355c6e8e1bcbf3746cf
	skipping to change at line 1550 ¶		skipping to change at line 1330 ¶
	bdf8bf3c926e10c7c12f934a887d86da4a4e5be70f5a169aa75720887bb690536		bdf8bf3c926e10c7c12f934a887d86da4a4e5be70f5a169aa75720887bb690536
	92a8f11f9cda7a72f281e4e3568e848225367946c70db09e718e3cba16193987b		92a8f11f9cda7a72f281e4e3568e848225367946c70db09e718e3cba16193987b
	c10bede3ef54c4d036c17cd4015bb113be60d7aa927e0d		c10bede3ef54c4d036c17cd4015bb113be60d7aa927e0d
	token: 00017617bc802cfdb5d74722ef7418bdbb4f2c88403820e55fe7ec07d3		token: 00017617bc802cfdb5d74722ef7418bdbb4f2c88403820e55fe7ec07d3
	190c29d665c994f7d5cdc2fb970b13d4e8eb6e6d8f9dcdaa65851fb091025dfe1		190c29d665c994f7d5cdc2fb970b13d4e8eb6e6d8f9dcdaa65851fb091025dfe1
	34bd5a62a116477bc9e1a205cca95d0c92335ca7a3e71063b2ac020bdd231c660		34bd5a62a116477bc9e1a205cca95d0c92335ca7a3e71063b2ac020bdd231c660
	97f12333ef438d00801bca5ace0fab8eb483dc04cd62578b95b5652921cd2698c		97f12333ef438d00801bca5ace0fab8eb483dc04cd62578b95b5652921cd2698c
	45ea74f6c8827b4e19f01140fa5bd039866f562		45ea74f6c8827b4e19f01140fa5bd039866f562
	// Test vector 3		// Test vector 3
	skS: 2b7709595b62b784f14946ae828f65e6caeba6eefe732c86e9ae50e818c0		skI: 2b7709595b62b784f14946ae828f65e6caeba6eefe732c86e9ae50e818c0
	55b3d7ca3a5f2beecaa859a62ff7199d35cc		55b3d7ca3a5f2beecaa859a62ff7199d35cc
	pkS: 03a0de1bf3fd0a73384283b648884ba9fa5dee190f9d7ad4292c2fd49d8b		pkI: 03a0de1bf3fd0a73384283b648884ba9fa5dee190f9d7ad4292c2fd49d8b
	4d64db674059df67f5bd7e626475c78934ae8d		4d64db674059df67f5bd7e626475c78934ae8d
	token_challenge: 0001000e6973737565722e6578616d706c65000017666f6f		token_challenge: 0001000e6973737565722e6578616d706c65000017666f6f
	2e6578616d706c652c6261722e6578616d706c65		2e6578616d706c652c6261722e6578616d706c65
	nonce:		nonce:
	87499b5930918d2d83ecebf92d25ca0722aa11b80dbbfd950537c28aa7d3a9df		87499b5930918d2d83ecebf92d25ca0722aa11b80dbbfd950537c28aa7d3a9df
	blind: 1f659584626ba15f44f3d887b2e5fe4c27315b185dfbfaea4253ebba30		blind: 1f659584626ba15f44f3d887b2e5fe4c27315b185dfbfaea4253ebba30
	610c4d9b73c78714c142360e85a00942c0fcff		610c4d9b73c78714c142360e85a00942c0fcff
	token_request: 0001c8024610a9f3aac21090f3079d6809437a2b94b4403c7e		token_request: 0001c8024610a9f3aac21090f3079d6809437a2b94b4403c7e
	645f849bc6c505dade154c258c8ecd4d2bdcf574daca65db671908		645f849bc6c505dade154c258c8ecd4d2bdcf574daca65db671908
	token_response: 03c2ab925d03e7793b4a4df6eb505210139f620359e142449		token_response: 03c2ab925d03e7793b4a4df6eb505210139f620359e142449
	skipping to change at line 1574 ¶		skipping to change at line 1354 ¶
	ff8829e27aaf7eb2cc7f9ab655477d71c01d5da5aef44dd076b5820b4710ef025		ff8829e27aaf7eb2cc7f9ab655477d71c01d5da5aef44dd076b5820b4710ef025
	a9e6c6b50a95af6105c5987c1b834d615008cf6370556ed00c6671e69776c09a9		a9e6c6b50a95af6105c5987c1b834d615008cf6370556ed00c6671e69776c09a9
	2b5ac84804750dd867c78817bdf69f1443002b18ae7a52		2b5ac84804750dd867c78817bdf69f1443002b18ae7a52
	token: 000187499b5930918d2d83ecebf92d25ca0722aa11b80dbbfd950537c2		token: 000187499b5930918d2d83ecebf92d25ca0722aa11b80dbbfd950537c2
	8aa7d3a9df1949fd455872478ba87e2e6c513c3261cddbe57220581245e4c9c91		8aa7d3a9df1949fd455872478ba87e2e6c513c3261cddbe57220581245e4c9c91
	1dd1c0bb865785bff8f3cfe08cccbb3a7b8e41d23a172871be4828cc54582d87b		1dd1c0bb865785bff8f3cfe08cccbb3a7b8e41d23a172871be4828cc54582d87b
	c7cfc5c8bcedc1868ebc845b000c317ed75312274a42b10be6db23bd8a168fd2f		c7cfc5c8bcedc1868ebc845b000c317ed75312274a42b10be6db23bd8a168fd2f
	021c23925d72c4d14cd7588c03845da0d41a326		021c23925d72c4d14cd7588c03845da0d41a326
	// Test vector 4		// Test vector 4
	skS: 22e237b7b983d77474e4495aff2fc1e10422b1d955192e0fbf2b7b618fba		skI: 22e237b7b983d77474e4495aff2fc1e10422b1d955192e0fbf2b7b618fba
	625fcb94b599da9113da49c495a48fbf7f7f		625fcb94b599da9113da49c495a48fbf7f7f
	pkS: 028cd68715caa20d19b2b20d017d6a0a42b9f2b0a47db65e5e763e23744f		pkI: 028cd68715caa20d19b2b20d017d6a0a42b9f2b0a47db65e5e763e23744f
	e14d74e374bbc93a2ec3970eb53c8aa765ee21		e14d74e374bbc93a2ec3970eb53c8aa765ee21
	token_challenge: 0001000e6973737565722e6578616d706c65000000		token_challenge: 0001000e6973737565722e6578616d706c65000000
	nonce:		nonce:
	02f0a206752d555a24924f2da5942a1bb4cb2d83ff473aa8b2bc3a89e820cd43		02f0a206752d555a24924f2da5942a1bb4cb2d83ff473aa8b2bc3a89e820cd43
	blind: af91d1dbcf6b46baecde70eb305b8fe75629199cca19c7f9344b8607b9		blind: af91d1dbcf6b46baecde70eb305b8fe75629199cca19c7f9344b8607b9
	0def27bc53e0345ade32c9fd0a1efda056d1c0		0def27bc53e0345ade32c9fd0a1efda056d1c0
	token_request: 0001a503632ebb003ed15b6de4557c047c7f81a58688143331		token_request: 0001a503632ebb003ed15b6de4557c047c7f81a58688143331
	2ad3ad7f9416f2dfc940d3f439ad1e8cd677d94ae7c05bc958d134		2ad3ad7f9416f2dfc940d3f439ad1e8cd677d94ae7c05bc958d134
	token_response: 032018bc3f180d9650e27f72de76a90b47e336ae9cb058548		token_response: 032018bc3f180d9650e27f72de76a90b47e336ae9cb058548
	d851c7046fa0875d96346c15cb39d8083cc6fb57216544c6a815c37d792769e12		d851c7046fa0875d96346c15cb39d8083cc6fb57216544c6a815c37d792769e12
	9c0513ce2034c3286cb212548f4aed1b0f71b28e219a71874a93e53ab2f473282		9c0513ce2034c3286cb212548f4aed1b0f71b28e219a71874a93e53ab2f473282
	71d1e9cbefc197a4f599a6825051fa1c6e55450042f04182b86c9cf12477a9f16		71d1e9cbefc197a4f599a6825051fa1c6e55450042f04182b86c9cf12477a9f16
	849396c051fa27012e81a86e6c4a9204a063f1e1722dd7		849396c051fa27012e81a86e6c4a9204a063f1e1722dd7
	token: 000102f0a206752d555a24924f2da5942a1bb4cb2d83ff473aa8b2bc3a		token: 000102f0a206752d555a24924f2da5942a1bb4cb2d83ff473aa8b2bc3a
	89e820cd43085cb06952044c7655b412ab7d484c97b97c48c79c568140b8d49a0		89e820cd43085cb06952044c7655b412ab7d484c97b97c48c79c568140b8d49a0
	2ca47a9cfb0a5cfb861290c4dbd8fd9b60ee9b1a1a54cf47c98531fe253f1ed6d		2ca47a9cfb0a5cfb861290c4dbd8fd9b60ee9b1a1a54cf47c98531fe253f1ed6d
	875de5a58f42db12b540b0d11bc5d6b42e6d17c2b73e98631e54d40fd2901ebec		875de5a58f42db12b540b0d11bc5d6b42e6d17c2b73e98631e54d40fd2901ebec
	4268668535b03cbf76f7f15a29d623a64cab0c4		4268668535b03cbf76f7f15a29d623a64cab0c4
	// Test vector 5		// Test vector 5
	skS: 46f3d4f562002b85ffcfdb4d06835fb9b2e24372861ecaa11357fd1f29f9		skI: 46f3d4f562002b85ffcfdb4d06835fb9b2e24372861ecaa11357fd1f29f9
	ed26e44715549ccedeb39257f095110f0159		ed26e44715549ccedeb39257f095110f0159
	pkS: 02fbe9da0b7cabe3ec51c36c8487b10909142b59af030c728a5e87bb3b30		pkI: 02fbe9da0b7cabe3ec51c36c8487b10909142b59af030c728a5e87bb3b30
	f54c06415d22e03d9212bd3d9a17d5520d4d0f		f54c06415d22e03d9212bd3d9a17d5520d4d0f
	token_challenge: 0001000e6973737565722e6578616d706c65205de58a52fc		token_challenge: 0001000e6973737565722e6578616d706c65205de58a52fc
	daef25ca3f65448d04e040fb1924e8264acfccfc6c5ad451d582b30000		daef25ca3f65448d04e040fb1924e8264acfccfc6c5ad451d582b30000
	nonce:		nonce:
	9ee54942d8a1604452a76856b1bfaf1cd608e1e3fa38acfd9f13e84483c90e89		9ee54942d8a1604452a76856b1bfaf1cd608e1e3fa38acfd9f13e84483c90e89
	blind: 76e0938e824b6cda6c163ff55d0298d539e222ed3984f4e31bbb654a8c		blind: 76e0938e824b6cda6c163ff55d0298d539e222ed3984f4e31bbb654a8c
	59671d4e0a7e264ca758cd0f4b533e0f60c5aa		59671d4e0a7e264ca758cd0f4b533e0f60c5aa
	token_request: 0001e10202bc92ac516c867f39399d71976018db52fcab5403		token_request: 0001e10202bc92ac516c867f39399d71976018db52fcab5403
	f8534a65677ba9e1e7d9b1d01767d137884c86cf5fe698c2f5d8e9		f8534a65677ba9e1e7d9b1d01767d137884c86cf5fe698c2f5d8e9
	token_response: 0322ea3856a71533796393229b33d33c02cd714e40d5aa4e0		token_response: 0322ea3856a71533796393229b33d33c02cd714e40d5aa4e0
	71f056276f32f89c09947eca8ff119d940d9d57c2fcbd83d2da494ddeb37dc1f6		71f056276f32f89c09947eca8ff119d940d9d57c2fcbd83d2da494ddeb37dc1f6
	78e5661a8e7bcc96b3477eb89d708b0ce10e0ea1b5ce0001f9332f743c0cc3d47		78e5661a8e7bcc96b3477eb89d708b0ce10e0ea1b5ce0001f9332f743c0cc3d47
	48233fea6d3152fae7844821268eb96ba491f60b1a3a848849310a39e9ef59121		48233fea6d3152fae7844821268eb96ba491f60b1a3a848849310a39e9ef59121
	669aa5d5dbb4b4deb532d2f907a01c5b39efaf23985080		669aa5d5dbb4b4deb532d2f907a01c5b39efaf23985080
	token: 00019ee54942d8a1604452a76856b1bfaf1cd608e1e3fa38acfd9f13e8		token: 00019ee54942d8a1604452a76856b1bfaf1cd608e1e3fa38acfd9f13e8
	4483c90e89d4380df12a1727f4e2ca1ee0d7abea0d0fb1e9506507a4dd618f9b8		4483c90e89d4380df12a1727f4e2ca1ee0d7abea0d0fb1e9506507a4dd618f9b8
	7e79f9f3521a7c9134d6722925bf622a994041cdb1b082cdf1309af32f0ce00ca		7e79f9f3521a7c9134d6722925bf622a994041cdb1b082cdf1309af32f0ce00ca
	1dab63e1b603747a8a5c3b46c7c2853de5ec7af8cac7cf3e089cecdc9ed3ff05c		1dab63e1b603747a8a5c3b46c7c2853de5ec7af8cac7cf3e089cecdc9ed3ff05c
	d24504fe4f6c52d24ac901471267d8b63b61e6b		d24504fe4f6c52d24ac901471267d8b63b61e6b
	]]></artwork>		]]></sourcecode>
	</section>		</section>
	<section anchor="test-vectors-rsa">		<section anchor="test-vectors-rsa">
	<name>Issuance Protocol 2 - Blind RSA, 2048</name>		<name>Issuance Protocol 2 - Blind RSA (2048-bit)</name>
	<t>The test vector below lists the following values:</t>		<t>The test vectors below list the following values:</t>
	<ul spacing="normal">		<dl spacing="normal">
	<li>skS: The PEM-encoded PKCS#8 RSA Issuer Private Key used for signin		<dt>skI:</dt><dd>The PEM-encoded PKCS #8 RSA Issuer Private Key used f
	g tokens,		or signing tokens,
	represented as a hexadecimal string.</li>		represented as a hexadecimal string.</dd>
	<li>pkS: The Issuer Public Key, serialized according to the encoding i		<dt>pkI:</dt><dd>The Issuer Public Key, serialized according to the en
	n <xref target="public-token-type"/>.</li>		coding in <xref target="public-token-type"/>.</dd>
	<li>token_challenge: A randomly generated TokenChallenge structure, re		<dt>token_challenge:</dt><dd>A randomly generated TokenChallenge struc
	presented		ture, represented
	as a hexadecimal string.</li>		as a hexadecimal string.</dd>
	<li>nonce: The 32-byte client nonce generated according to <xref targe		<dt>nonce:</dt><dd>The 32-byte Client nonce generated according to <xr
	t="public-request"/>,		ef target="public-request"/>,
	represented as a hexadecimal string.</li>		represented as a hexadecimal string.</dd>
	<li>blind: The blind used when computing the blind RSA blinded message		<dt>blind:</dt><dd>The blind used when computing the blind RSA blinded
	,		message,
	represented as a hexadecimal string.</li>		represented as a hexadecimal string.</dd>
	<li>salt: The randomly generated 48-byte salt used when encoding the b		<dt>salt:</dt><dd>The randomly generated 48-byte salt used when encodi
	linded		ng the blinded
	token request message, represented as a hexadecimal string.</li>		TokenRequest message, represented as a hexadecimal string.</dd>
	<li>token_request: The TokenRequest message constructed according to		<dt>token_request:</dt><dd>The TokenRequest message constructed accord
	<xref target="public-request"/>, represented as a hexadecimal string.</li>		ing to
	<li>token_request: The TokenResponse message constructed according to		<xref target="public-request"/>, represented as a hexadecimal string.</dd>
	<xref target="public-response"/>, represented as a hexadecimal string.</li>		<dt>token_response:</dt><dd>The TokenResponse message constructed acco
	<li>token: The output Token from the protocol, represented as a hexade		rding to
	cimal		<xref target="public-response"/>, represented as a hexadecimal string.</dd>
	string.</li>		<dt>token:</dt><dd>The output token from the protocol, represented as
	</ul>		a hexadecimal
	<artwork><![CDATA[		string.</dd>
			</dl>
			<sourcecode name="" type="test-vectors"><![CDATA[
	// Test vector 1		// Test vector 1
	skS: 2d2d2d2d2d424547494e2050524956415445204b45592d2d2d2d2d0a4d49		skI: 2d2d2d2d2d424547494e2050524956415445204b45592d2d2d2d2d0a4d49
	4945765149424144414e42676b71686b6947397730424151454641415343424b6		4945765149424144414e42676b71686b6947397730424151454641415343424b6
	3776767536a41674541416f49424151444c4775317261705831736334420a4f6b		3776767536a41674541416f49424151444c4775317261705831736334420a4f6b
	7a38717957355379356b6f6a41303543554b66717444774e38366a424b5a4f764		7a38717957355379356b6f6a41303543554b66717444774e38366a424b5a4f764
	57245526b49314c527876734d6453327961326333616b4745714c756b440a556a		57245526b49314c527876734d6453327961326333616b4745714c756b440a556a
	35743561496b3172417643655844644e44503442325055707851436e6969396e6		35743561496b3172417643655844644e44503442325055707851436e6969396e6
	b492b6d67725769744444494871386139793137586e6c5079596f784f530a646f		b492b6d67725769744444494871386139793137586e6c5079596f784f530a646f
	6558563835464f314a752b62397336356d586d34516a755139455961497138337		6558563835464f314a752b62397336356d586d34516a755139455961497138337
	1724450567a50335758712b524e4d636379323269686763624c766d42390a6a41		1724450567a50335758712b524e4d636379323269686763624c766d42390a6a41
	355334475666325a6c74785954736f4c364872377a58696a4e394637486271656		355334475666325a6c74785954736f4c364872377a58696a4e394637486271656
	76f753967654b524d584645352f2b4a3956595a634a734a624c756570480a544f		76f753967654b524d584645352f2b4a3956595a634a734a624c756570480a544f
	skipping to change at line 1698 ¶		skipping to change at line 1478 ¶
	7844733968355272627852614e6673542b7241554837783153594456565159564		7844733968355272627852614e6673542b7241554837783153594456565159564
	d68555262546f5a6536472f6a716e544333664e6648563178745a666f740a306c		d68555262546f5a6536472f6a716e544333664e6648563178745a666f740a306c
	6f4d4867776570362b53494d436f6565325a6374755a5633326c6349616639726		6f4d4867776570362b53494d436f6565325a6374755a5633326c6349616639726
	2484f633764416f47416551386b3853494c4e4736444f413331544535500a6d30		2484f633764416f47416551386b3853494c4e4736444f413331544535500a6d30
	31414a49597737416c5233756f2f524e61432b78596450553354736b75414c787		31414a49597737416c5233756f2f524e61432b78596450553354736b75414c787
	86944522f57734c455142436a6b46576d6d4a41576e51554474626e594e0a5363		86944522f57734c455142436a6b46576d6d4a41576e51554474626e594e0a5363
	77523847324a36466e72454374627479733733574156476f6f465a6e636d504c5		77523847324a36466e72454374627479733733574156476f6f465a6e636d504c5
	0386c784c79626c534244454c79615a762f624173506c4d4f39624435630a4a2b		0386c784c79626c534244454c79615a762f624173506c4d4f39624435630a4a2b
	4e534261612b6f694c6c31776d4361354d43666c633d0a2d2d2d2d2d454e44205		4e534261612b6f694c6c31776d4361354d43666c633d0a2d2d2d2d2d454e44205
	0524956415445204b45592d2d2d2d2d0a		0524956415445204b45592d2d2d2d2d0a
	pkS: 30820152303d06092a864886f70d01010a3030a00d300b06096086480165		pkI: 30820152303d06092a864886f70d01010a3030a00d300b06096086480165
	03040202a11a301806092a864886f70d010108300b0609608648016503040202a		03040202a11a301806092a864886f70d010108300b0609608648016503040202a
	2030201300382010f003082010a0282010100cb1aed6b6a95f5b1ce013a4cfcab		2030201300382010f003082010a0282010100cb1aed6b6a95f5b1ce013a4cfcab
	25b94b2e64a23034e4250a7eab43c0df3a8c12993af12b111908d4b471bec31d4		25b94b2e64a23034e4250a7eab43c0df3a8c12993af12b111908d4b471bec31d4
	b6c9ad9cdda90612a2ee903523e6de5a224d6b02f09e5c374d0cfe01d8f529c50		b6c9ad9cdda90612a2ee903523e6de5a224d6b02f09e5c374d0cfe01d8f529c50
	0a78a2f67908fa682b5a2b430c81eaf1af72d7b5e794fc98a3139276879757ce4		0a78a2f67908fa682b5a2b430c81eaf1af72d7b5e794fc98a3139276879757ce4
	53b526ef9bf6ceb99979b8423b90f4461a22af37aab0cf5733f7597abe44d31c7		53b526ef9bf6ceb99979b8423b90f4461a22af37aab0cf5733f7597abe44d31c7
	32db68a181c6cbbe607d8c0e52e0655fd9996dc584eca0be87afbcd78a337d17b		32db68a181c6cbbe607d8c0e52e0655fd9996dc584eca0be87afbcd78a337d17b
	1dba9e828bbd81e291317144e7ff89f55619709b096cbb9ea474cead264c2073f		1dba9e828bbd81e291317144e7ff89f55619709b096cbb9ea474cead264c2073f
	e49740c01f00e109106066983d21e5f83f086e2e823c879cd43cef700d2a352a9		e49740c01f00e109106066983d21e5f83f086e2e823c879cd43cef700d2a352a9
	babd612d03cad02db134b7e225a5f0203010001		babd612d03cad02db134b7e225a5f0203010001
	skipping to change at line 1755 ¶		skipping to change at line 1535 ¶
	71cd2708bc6a21b533d07294b5e900faf5537dd3eb33cee4e08c9670d1e5358fd		71cd2708bc6a21b533d07294b5e900faf5537dd3eb33cee4e08c9670d1e5358fd
	184b0e00c637174f5206b14c7bb0e724ebf6b56271e5aa2ed94c051c4a433d302		184b0e00c637174f5206b14c7bb0e724ebf6b56271e5aa2ed94c051c4a433d302
	b23bc52460810d489fb050f9de5c868c6c1b06e3849fd087629f704cc724bc0d0		b23bc52460810d489fb050f9de5c868c6c1b06e3849fd087629f704cc724bc0d0
	984d5c339686fcdd75f9a9cdd25f37f855f6f4c584d84f716864f546b696d620c		984d5c339686fcdd75f9a9cdd25f37f855f6f4c584d84f716864f546b696d620c
	5bd41a811498de84ff9740ba3003ba2422d26b91eb745c084758974642a420782		5bd41a811498de84ff9740ba3003ba2422d26b91eb745c084758974642a420782
	01543246ddb58030ea8e722376aa82484dca9610a8fb7e018e396165462e17a03		01543246ddb58030ea8e722376aa82484dca9610a8fb7e018e396165462e17a03
	e40ea7e128c090a911ecc708066cb201833010c1ebd4e910fc8e27a1be467f786		e40ea7e128c090a911ecc708066cb201833010c1ebd4e910fc8e27a1be467f786
	71836a508257123a45e4e0ae2180a434bd1037713466347a8ebe46439d3da1970		71836a508257123a45e4e0ae2180a434bd1037713466347a8ebe46439d3da1970
	// Test vector 2		// Test vector 2
	skS: 2d2d2d2d2d424547494e2050524956415445204b45592d2d2d2d2d0a4d49		skI: 2d2d2d2d2d424547494e2050524956415445204b45592d2d2d2d2d0a4d49
	4945765149424144414e42676b71686b6947397730424151454641415343424b6		4945765149424144414e42676b71686b6947397730424151454641415343424b6
	3776767536a41674541416f49424151444c4775317261705831736334420a4f6b		3776767536a41674541416f49424151444c4775317261705831736334420a4f6b
	7a38717957355379356b6f6a41303543554b66717444774e38366a424b5a4f764		7a38717957355379356b6f6a41303543554b66717444774e38366a424b5a4f764
	57245526b49314c527876734d6453327961326333616b4745714c756b440a556a		57245526b49314c527876734d6453327961326333616b4745714c756b440a556a
	35743561496b3172417643655844644e44503442325055707851436e6969396e6		35743561496b3172417643655844644e44503442325055707851436e6969396e6
	b492b6d67725769744444494871386139793137586e6c5079596f784f530a646f		b492b6d67725769744444494871386139793137586e6c5079596f784f530a646f
	6558563835464f314a752b62397336356d586d34516a755139455961497138337		6558563835464f314a752b62397336356d586d34516a755139455961497138337
	1724450567a50335758712b524e4d636379323269686763624c766d42390a6a41		1724450567a50335758712b524e4d636379323269686763624c766d42390a6a41
	355334475666325a6c74785954736f4c364872377a58696a4e394637486271656		355334475666325a6c74785954736f4c364872377a58696a4e394637486271656
	76f753967654b524d584645352f2b4a3956595a634a734a624c756570480a544f		76f753967654b524d584645352f2b4a3956595a634a734a624c756570480a544f
	skipping to change at line 1808 ¶		skipping to change at line 1588 ¶
	7844733968355272627852614e6673542b7241554837783153594456565159564		7844733968355272627852614e6673542b7241554837783153594456565159564
	d68555262546f5a6536472f6a716e544333664e6648563178745a666f740a306c		d68555262546f5a6536472f6a716e544333664e6648563178745a666f740a306c
	6f4d4867776570362b53494d436f6565325a6374755a5633326c6349616639726		6f4d4867776570362b53494d436f6565325a6374755a5633326c6349616639726
	2484f633764416f47416551386b3853494c4e4736444f413331544535500a6d30		2484f633764416f47416551386b3853494c4e4736444f413331544535500a6d30
	31414a49597737416c5233756f2f524e61432b78596450553354736b75414c787		31414a49597737416c5233756f2f524e61432b78596450553354736b75414c787
	86944522f57734c455142436a6b46576d6d4a41576e51554474626e594e0a5363		86944522f57734c455142436a6b46576d6d4a41576e51554474626e594e0a5363
	77523847324a36466e72454374627479733733574156476f6f465a6e636d504c5		77523847324a36466e72454374627479733733574156476f6f465a6e636d504c5
	0386c784c79626c534244454c79615a762f624173506c4d4f39624435630a4a2b		0386c784c79626c534244454c79615a762f624173506c4d4f39624435630a4a2b
	4e534261612b6f694c6c31776d4361354d43666c633d0a2d2d2d2d2d454e44205		4e534261612b6f694c6c31776d4361354d43666c633d0a2d2d2d2d2d454e44205
	0524956415445204b45592d2d2d2d2d0a		0524956415445204b45592d2d2d2d2d0a
	pkS: 30820152303d06092a864886f70d01010a3030a00d300b06096086480165		pkI: 30820152303d06092a864886f70d01010a3030a00d300b06096086480165
	03040202a11a301806092a864886f70d010108300b0609608648016503040202a		03040202a11a301806092a864886f70d010108300b0609608648016503040202a
	2030201300382010f003082010a0282010100cb1aed6b6a95f5b1ce013a4cfcab		2030201300382010f003082010a0282010100cb1aed6b6a95f5b1ce013a4cfcab
	25b94b2e64a23034e4250a7eab43c0df3a8c12993af12b111908d4b471bec31d4		25b94b2e64a23034e4250a7eab43c0df3a8c12993af12b111908d4b471bec31d4
	b6c9ad9cdda90612a2ee903523e6de5a224d6b02f09e5c374d0cfe01d8f529c50		b6c9ad9cdda90612a2ee903523e6de5a224d6b02f09e5c374d0cfe01d8f529c50
	0a78a2f67908fa682b5a2b430c81eaf1af72d7b5e794fc98a3139276879757ce4		0a78a2f67908fa682b5a2b430c81eaf1af72d7b5e794fc98a3139276879757ce4
	53b526ef9bf6ceb99979b8423b90f4461a22af37aab0cf5733f7597abe44d31c7		53b526ef9bf6ceb99979b8423b90f4461a22af37aab0cf5733f7597abe44d31c7
	32db68a181c6cbbe607d8c0e52e0655fd9996dc584eca0be87afbcd78a337d17b		32db68a181c6cbbe607d8c0e52e0655fd9996dc584eca0be87afbcd78a337d17b
	1dba9e828bbd81e291317144e7ff89f55619709b096cbb9ea474cead264c2073f		1dba9e828bbd81e291317144e7ff89f55619709b096cbb9ea474cead264c2073f
	e49740c01f00e109106066983d21e5f83f086e2e823c879cd43cef700d2a352a9		e49740c01f00e109106066983d21e5f83f086e2e823c879cd43cef700d2a352a9
	babd612d03cad02db134b7e225a5f0203010001		babd612d03cad02db134b7e225a5f0203010001
	skipping to change at line 1864 ¶		skipping to change at line 1644 ¶
	71cd27083350a206c5e9b7c0898f97611ce0bb8d74d310bb194ab67e094e32ff6		71cd27083350a206c5e9b7c0898f97611ce0bb8d74d310bb194ab67e094e32ff6
	da90886924b1b9e7b569402c1101d896d2fc3a7371ef77f02310db1dc9f81c853		da90886924b1b9e7b569402c1101d896d2fc3a7371ef77f02310db1dc9f81c853
	5828c2d0e9d9051720d182cd54e1c2c3bf417da2fc7aa72bb70ccc834ef274a2e		5828c2d0e9d9051720d182cd54e1c2c3bf417da2fc7aa72bb70ccc834ef274a2e
	809c9821b3d395d6535423f7428b3f29175d6eb840b4b7685336e57e2b6afeaab		809c9821b3d395d6535423f7428b3f29175d6eb840b4b7685336e57e2b6afeaab
	c0c17ea4f557e8a9cc2f624e245c6ccd7cbdd6c32c97c5c6974e802f688e2d25f		c0c17ea4f557e8a9cc2f624e245c6ccd7cbdd6c32c97c5c6974e802f688e2d25f
	0aba4215f609f692244517d5d3407e0172273982c001c158f5fcbe1b5d2447c26		0aba4215f609f692244517d5d3407e0172273982c001c158f5fcbe1b5d2447c26
	a87e89f5a9e72b498b0c59ce749823d2cf253d3cf6cd4e64fa0e434d95e488789		a87e89f5a9e72b498b0c59ce749823d2cf253d3cf6cd4e64fa0e434d95e488789
	247a9ceed756ff4ff33a8d2402c0db381236d331092838b608a42002552092897		247a9ceed756ff4ff33a8d2402c0db381236d331092838b608a42002552092897
	// Test vector 3		// Test vector 3
	skS: 2d2d2d2d2d424547494e2050524956415445204b45592d2d2d2d2d0a4d49		skI: 2d2d2d2d2d424547494e2050524956415445204b45592d2d2d2d2d0a4d49
	4945765149424144414e42676b71686b6947397730424151454641415343424b6		4945765149424144414e42676b71686b6947397730424151454641415343424b6
	3776767536a41674541416f49424151444c4775317261705831736334420a4f6b		3776767536a41674541416f49424151444c4775317261705831736334420a4f6b
	7a38717957355379356b6f6a41303543554b66717444774e38366a424b5a4f764		7a38717957355379356b6f6a41303543554b66717444774e38366a424b5a4f764
	57245526b49314c527876734d6453327961326333616b4745714c756b440a556a		57245526b49314c527876734d6453327961326333616b4745714c756b440a556a
	35743561496b3172417643655844644e44503442325055707851436e6969396e6		35743561496b3172417643655844644e44503442325055707851436e6969396e6
	b492b6d67725769744444494871386139793137586e6c5079596f784f530a646f		b492b6d67725769744444494871386139793137586e6c5079596f784f530a646f
	6558563835464f314a752b62397336356d586d34516a755139455961497138337		6558563835464f314a752b62397336356d586d34516a755139455961497138337
	1724450567a50335758712b524e4d636379323269686763624c766d42390a6a41		1724450567a50335758712b524e4d636379323269686763624c766d42390a6a41
	355334475666325a6c74785954736f4c364872377a58696a4e394637486271656		355334475666325a6c74785954736f4c364872377a58696a4e394637486271656
	76f753967654b524d584645352f2b4a3956595a634a734a624c756570480a544f		76f753967654b524d584645352f2b4a3956595a634a734a624c756570480a544f
	skipping to change at line 1917 ¶		skipping to change at line 1697 ¶
	7844733968355272627852614e6673542b7241554837783153594456565159564		7844733968355272627852614e6673542b7241554837783153594456565159564
	d68555262546f5a6536472f6a716e544333664e6648563178745a666f740a306c		d68555262546f5a6536472f6a716e544333664e6648563178745a666f740a306c
	6f4d4867776570362b53494d436f6565325a6374755a5633326c6349616639726		6f4d4867776570362b53494d436f6565325a6374755a5633326c6349616639726
	2484f633764416f47416551386b3853494c4e4736444f413331544535500a6d30		2484f633764416f47416551386b3853494c4e4736444f413331544535500a6d30
	31414a49597737416c5233756f2f524e61432b78596450553354736b75414c787		31414a49597737416c5233756f2f524e61432b78596450553354736b75414c787
	86944522f57734c455142436a6b46576d6d4a41576e51554474626e594e0a5363		86944522f57734c455142436a6b46576d6d4a41576e51554474626e594e0a5363
	77523847324a36466e72454374627479733733574156476f6f465a6e636d504c5		77523847324a36466e72454374627479733733574156476f6f465a6e636d504c5
	0386c784c79626c534244454c79615a762f624173506c4d4f39624435630a4a2b		0386c784c79626c534244454c79615a762f624173506c4d4f39624435630a4a2b
	4e534261612b6f694c6c31776d4361354d43666c633d0a2d2d2d2d2d454e44205		4e534261612b6f694c6c31776d4361354d43666c633d0a2d2d2d2d2d454e44205
	0524956415445204b45592d2d2d2d2d0a		0524956415445204b45592d2d2d2d2d0a
	pkS: 30820152303d06092a864886f70d01010a3030a00d300b06096086480165		pkI: 30820152303d06092a864886f70d01010a3030a00d300b06096086480165
	03040202a11a301806092a864886f70d010108300b0609608648016503040202a		03040202a11a301806092a864886f70d010108300b0609608648016503040202a
	2030201300382010f003082010a0282010100cb1aed6b6a95f5b1ce013a4cfcab		2030201300382010f003082010a0282010100cb1aed6b6a95f5b1ce013a4cfcab
	25b94b2e64a23034e4250a7eab43c0df3a8c12993af12b111908d4b471bec31d4		25b94b2e64a23034e4250a7eab43c0df3a8c12993af12b111908d4b471bec31d4
	b6c9ad9cdda90612a2ee903523e6de5a224d6b02f09e5c374d0cfe01d8f529c50		b6c9ad9cdda90612a2ee903523e6de5a224d6b02f09e5c374d0cfe01d8f529c50
	0a78a2f67908fa682b5a2b430c81eaf1af72d7b5e794fc98a3139276879757ce4		0a78a2f67908fa682b5a2b430c81eaf1af72d7b5e794fc98a3139276879757ce4
	53b526ef9bf6ceb99979b8423b90f4461a22af37aab0cf5733f7597abe44d31c7		53b526ef9bf6ceb99979b8423b90f4461a22af37aab0cf5733f7597abe44d31c7
	32db68a181c6cbbe607d8c0e52e0655fd9996dc584eca0be87afbcd78a337d17b		32db68a181c6cbbe607d8c0e52e0655fd9996dc584eca0be87afbcd78a337d17b
	1dba9e828bbd81e291317144e7ff89f55619709b096cbb9ea474cead264c2073f		1dba9e828bbd81e291317144e7ff89f55619709b096cbb9ea474cead264c2073f
	e49740c01f00e109106066983d21e5f83f086e2e823c879cd43cef700d2a352a9		e49740c01f00e109106066983d21e5f83f086e2e823c879cd43cef700d2a352a9
	babd612d03cad02db134b7e225a5f0203010001		babd612d03cad02db134b7e225a5f0203010001
	skipping to change at line 1973 ¶		skipping to change at line 1753 ¶
	71cd270815b010bbc0d5f55e9c856d2e9ffaefba007d33c2d5452fbeb0b15919b		71cd270815b010bbc0d5f55e9c856d2e9ffaefba007d33c2d5452fbeb0b15919b
	973e0dc9180aaeb18242043758d9fb0ac9ac5e04da9ff74ec93644ae6cdb7068e		973e0dc9180aaeb18242043758d9fb0ac9ac5e04da9ff74ec93644ae6cdb7068e
	a76ce2295b9b95e383ed3a9856e9f618dafdf4cec5d2b53ea4297c2f3990babca		a76ce2295b9b95e383ed3a9856e9f618dafdf4cec5d2b53ea4297c2f3990babca
	71e3ccd6c07a437daae7ed27b6b81178fb7ce5fa5dd63781cc64ac1e410f441c0		71e3ccd6c07a437daae7ed27b6b81178fb7ce5fa5dd63781cc64ac1e410f441c0
	34b0a5cc873a2ce875e8b38c92bab563635c4f8f4fa35d1f582ef19edf7da75aa		34b0a5cc873a2ce875e8b38c92bab563635c4f8f4fa35d1f582ef19edf7da75aa
	11a503a82e32a12bd4da41e0ca7ec7f451caf586f5b910003fcbbb9ff5ffa2408		11a503a82e32a12bd4da41e0ca7ec7f451caf586f5b910003fcbbb9ff5ffa2408
	c28d6807737d03da651ea9bfafcc2747a6830e19a1d160fcd5c25d2f79dad86a8		c28d6807737d03da651ea9bfafcc2747a6830e19a1d160fcd5c25d2f79dad86a8
	b3de8e926e08ca1addced72977f7b56398ef59c26e725df0a976a08f2a936ca42		b3de8e926e08ca1addced72977f7b56398ef59c26e725df0a976a08f2a936ca42
	// Test vector 4		// Test vector 4
	skS: 2d2d2d2d2d424547494e2050524956415445204b45592d2d2d2d2d0a4d49		skI: 2d2d2d2d2d424547494e2050524956415445204b45592d2d2d2d2d0a4d49
	4945765149424144414e42676b71686b6947397730424151454641415343424b6		4945765149424144414e42676b71686b6947397730424151454641415343424b6
	3776767536a41674541416f49424151444c4775317261705831736334420a4f6b		3776767536a41674541416f49424151444c4775317261705831736334420a4f6b
	7a38717957355379356b6f6a41303543554b66717444774e38366a424b5a4f764		7a38717957355379356b6f6a41303543554b66717444774e38366a424b5a4f764
	57245526b49314c527876734d6453327961326333616b4745714c756b440a556a		57245526b49314c527876734d6453327961326333616b4745714c756b440a556a
	35743561496b3172417643655844644e44503442325055707851436e6969396e6		35743561496b3172417643655844644e44503442325055707851436e6969396e6
	b492b6d67725769744444494871386139793137586e6c5079596f784f530a646f		b492b6d67725769744444494871386139793137586e6c5079596f784f530a646f
	6558563835464f314a752b62397336356d586d34516a755139455961497138337		6558563835464f314a752b62397336356d586d34516a755139455961497138337
	1724450567a50335758712b524e4d636379323269686763624c766d42390a6a41		1724450567a50335758712b524e4d636379323269686763624c766d42390a6a41
	355334475666325a6c74785954736f4c364872377a58696a4e394637486271656		355334475666325a6c74785954736f4c364872377a58696a4e394637486271656
	76f753967654b524d584645352f2b4a3956595a634a734a624c756570480a544f		76f753967654b524d584645352f2b4a3956595a634a734a624c756570480a544f
	skipping to change at line 2026 ¶		skipping to change at line 1806 ¶
	7844733968355272627852614e6673542b7241554837783153594456565159564		7844733968355272627852614e6673542b7241554837783153594456565159564
	d68555262546f5a6536472f6a716e544333664e6648563178745a666f740a306c		d68555262546f5a6536472f6a716e544333664e6648563178745a666f740a306c
	6f4d4867776570362b53494d436f6565325a6374755a5633326c6349616639726		6f4d4867776570362b53494d436f6565325a6374755a5633326c6349616639726
	2484f633764416f47416551386b3853494c4e4736444f413331544535500a6d30		2484f633764416f47416551386b3853494c4e4736444f413331544535500a6d30
	31414a49597737416c5233756f2f524e61432b78596450553354736b75414c787		31414a49597737416c5233756f2f524e61432b78596450553354736b75414c787
	86944522f57734c455142436a6b46576d6d4a41576e51554474626e594e0a5363		86944522f57734c455142436a6b46576d6d4a41576e51554474626e594e0a5363
	77523847324a36466e72454374627479733733574156476f6f465a6e636d504c5		77523847324a36466e72454374627479733733574156476f6f465a6e636d504c5
	0386c784c79626c534244454c79615a762f624173506c4d4f39624435630a4a2b		0386c784c79626c534244454c79615a762f624173506c4d4f39624435630a4a2b
	4e534261612b6f694c6c31776d4361354d43666c633d0a2d2d2d2d2d454e44205		4e534261612b6f694c6c31776d4361354d43666c633d0a2d2d2d2d2d454e44205
	0524956415445204b45592d2d2d2d2d0a		0524956415445204b45592d2d2d2d2d0a
	pkS: 30820152303d06092a864886f70d01010a3030a00d300b06096086480165		pkI: 30820152303d06092a864886f70d01010a3030a00d300b06096086480165
	03040202a11a301806092a864886f70d010108300b0609608648016503040202a		03040202a11a301806092a864886f70d010108300b0609608648016503040202a
	2030201300382010f003082010a0282010100cb1aed6b6a95f5b1ce013a4cfcab		2030201300382010f003082010a0282010100cb1aed6b6a95f5b1ce013a4cfcab
	25b94b2e64a23034e4250a7eab43c0df3a8c12993af12b111908d4b471bec31d4		25b94b2e64a23034e4250a7eab43c0df3a8c12993af12b111908d4b471bec31d4
	b6c9ad9cdda90612a2ee903523e6de5a224d6b02f09e5c374d0cfe01d8f529c50		b6c9ad9cdda90612a2ee903523e6de5a224d6b02f09e5c374d0cfe01d8f529c50
	0a78a2f67908fa682b5a2b430c81eaf1af72d7b5e794fc98a3139276879757ce4		0a78a2f67908fa682b5a2b430c81eaf1af72d7b5e794fc98a3139276879757ce4
	53b526ef9bf6ceb99979b8423b90f4461a22af37aab0cf5733f7597abe44d31c7		53b526ef9bf6ceb99979b8423b90f4461a22af37aab0cf5733f7597abe44d31c7
	32db68a181c6cbbe607d8c0e52e0655fd9996dc584eca0be87afbcd78a337d17b		32db68a181c6cbbe607d8c0e52e0655fd9996dc584eca0be87afbcd78a337d17b
	1dba9e828bbd81e291317144e7ff89f55619709b096cbb9ea474cead264c2073f		1dba9e828bbd81e291317144e7ff89f55619709b096cbb9ea474cead264c2073f
	e49740c01f00e109106066983d21e5f83f086e2e823c879cd43cef700d2a352a9		e49740c01f00e109106066983d21e5f83f086e2e823c879cd43cef700d2a352a9
	babd612d03cad02db134b7e225a5f0203010001		babd612d03cad02db134b7e225a5f0203010001
	skipping to change at line 2081 ¶		skipping to change at line 1861 ¶
	71cd2708a55c83dc04292b5d92add1a87b37e54f22f61c58840586f390c50b231		71cd2708a55c83dc04292b5d92add1a87b37e54f22f61c58840586f390c50b231
	824423378ddcf50e69dc817d45bfad06c7f2a0ac35d2acd7f26b0bc9954c192b0		824423378ddcf50e69dc817d45bfad06c7f2a0ac35d2acd7f26b0bc9954c192b0
	a0ef28a2a5650e390098dd3cb1166a7cb1716d3dd2d19dc5ca3b1ea6206359de0		a0ef28a2a5650e390098dd3cb1166a7cb1716d3dd2d19dc5ca3b1ea6206359de0
	002d82bc4fa7e69fb07214b06addcbd2203d1e17f57fc580bcc5a13e0ac15cf94		002d82bc4fa7e69fb07214b06addcbd2203d1e17f57fc580bcc5a13e0ac15cf94
	2182cc2b5d6eaa737a712704114e357e2ec2f10047463ded02a1a0766dc346dd7		2182cc2b5d6eaa737a712704114e357e2ec2f10047463ded02a1a0766dc346dd7
	212b9711e03ac95eb258ac1164104dc9a0d3e738ae742ab5ed8c5139fc07145a7		212b9711e03ac95eb258ac1164104dc9a0d3e738ae742ab5ed8c5139fc07145a7
	88b9f891741ee68f0a66782b7b84a9bb4cb4b3d1b26b67106f397b35b641d882d		88b9f891741ee68f0a66782b7b84a9bb4cb4b3d1b26b67106f397b35b641d882d
	7b0185168946de898ef72349a44a47dbdd6d46e9ba9ba543d5701b65c63d645c2		7b0185168946de898ef72349a44a47dbdd6d46e9ba9ba543d5701b65c63d645c2
	// Test vector 5		// Test vector 5
	skS: 2d2d2d2d2d424547494e2050524956415445204b45592d2d2d2d2d0a4d49		skI: 2d2d2d2d2d424547494e2050524956415445204b45592d2d2d2d2d0a4d49
	4945765149424144414e42676b71686b6947397730424151454641415343424b6		4945765149424144414e42676b71686b6947397730424151454641415343424b6
	3776767536a41674541416f49424151444c4775317261705831736334420a4f6b		3776767536a41674541416f49424151444c4775317261705831736334420a4f6b
	7a38717957355379356b6f6a41303543554b66717444774e38366a424b5a4f764		7a38717957355379356b6f6a41303543554b66717444774e38366a424b5a4f764
	57245526b49314c527876734d6453327961326333616b4745714c756b440a556a		57245526b49314c527876734d6453327961326333616b4745714c756b440a556a
	35743561496b3172417643655844644e44503442325055707851436e6969396e6		35743561496b3172417643655844644e44503442325055707851436e6969396e6
	b492b6d67725769744444494871386139793137586e6c5079596f784f530a646f		b492b6d67725769744444494871386139793137586e6c5079596f784f530a646f
	6558563835464f314a752b62397336356d586d34516a755139455961497138337		6558563835464f314a752b62397336356d586d34516a755139455961497138337
	1724450567a50335758712b524e4d636379323269686763624c766d42390a6a41		1724450567a50335758712b524e4d636379323269686763624c766d42390a6a41
	355334475666325a6c74785954736f4c364872377a58696a4e394637486271656		355334475666325a6c74785954736f4c364872377a58696a4e394637486271656
	76f753967654b524d584645352f2b4a3956595a634a734a624c756570480a544f		76f753967654b524d584645352f2b4a3956595a634a734a624c756570480a544f
	skipping to change at line 2134 ¶		skipping to change at line 1914 ¶
	7844733968355272627852614e6673542b7241554837783153594456565159564		7844733968355272627852614e6673542b7241554837783153594456565159564
	d68555262546f5a6536472f6a716e544333664e6648563178745a666f740a306c		d68555262546f5a6536472f6a716e544333664e6648563178745a666f740a306c
	6f4d4867776570362b53494d436f6565325a6374755a5633326c6349616639726		6f4d4867776570362b53494d436f6565325a6374755a5633326c6349616639726
	2484f633764416f47416551386b3853494c4e4736444f413331544535500a6d30		2484f633764416f47416551386b3853494c4e4736444f413331544535500a6d30
	31414a49597737416c5233756f2f524e61432b78596450553354736b75414c787		31414a49597737416c5233756f2f524e61432b78596450553354736b75414c787
	86944522f57734c455142436a6b46576d6d4a41576e51554474626e594e0a5363		86944522f57734c455142436a6b46576d6d4a41576e51554474626e594e0a5363
	77523847324a36466e72454374627479733733574156476f6f465a6e636d504c5		77523847324a36466e72454374627479733733574156476f6f465a6e636d504c5
	0386c784c79626c534244454c79615a762f624173506c4d4f39624435630a4a2b		0386c784c79626c534244454c79615a762f624173506c4d4f39624435630a4a2b
	4e534261612b6f694c6c31776d4361354d43666c633d0a2d2d2d2d2d454e44205		4e534261612b6f694c6c31776d4361354d43666c633d0a2d2d2d2d2d454e44205
	0524956415445204b45592d2d2d2d2d0a		0524956415445204b45592d2d2d2d2d0a
	pkS: 30820152303d06092a864886f70d01010a3030a00d300b06096086480165		pkI: 30820152303d06092a864886f70d01010a3030a00d300b06096086480165
	03040202a11a301806092a864886f70d010108300b0609608648016503040202a		03040202a11a301806092a864886f70d010108300b0609608648016503040202a
	2030201300382010f003082010a0282010100cb1aed6b6a95f5b1ce013a4cfcab		2030201300382010f003082010a0282010100cb1aed6b6a95f5b1ce013a4cfcab
	25b94b2e64a23034e4250a7eab43c0df3a8c12993af12b111908d4b471bec31d4		25b94b2e64a23034e4250a7eab43c0df3a8c12993af12b111908d4b471bec31d4
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	]]></artwork>		]]></sourcecode>
	</section>		</section>
	</section>		</section>
			<section anchor="acknowledgements" numbered="false">
			<name>Acknowledgements</name>
			<t>The authors of this document would like to acknowledge the helpful
			feedback and discussions from <contact fullname="Benjamin Schwartz"/>, <contact
			fullname="Joseph Salowey"/>, and <contact fullname="Tara Whalen"/>.</t>
			</section>
	</back>		</back>
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